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Highlights 
- Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has few chances to benefit from a changed gas market. 
- CEE states are dependent on gas, gas imports, Russian gas and transit to differing degrees. 
- Powerful economic arguments help explain limited progress with diversification. 
- Transit-avoidance pipelines could increase security of supply for CEE gas consumers. 
- Non-Russian gas could be more expensive and may also involve (other) security risks. 
 
 
Abstract 
The Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2009 encouraged Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to 
diversify away from Russian gas supplies and new gas market conditions have afforded some 
opportunities for doing so. This paper assesses these achievements, as well as factors preventing CEE 
countries from benefiting therefrom. The paper addresses four main areas of CEE diversification: (1) gas 
demand, (2) domestic gas production, (3) transit, as well as (4) gas supply and physical infrastructure for 
source diversification. There is great variation in the degree of dependence on gas, gas imports, Russian 
gas and transit countries, across the CEE states. Some progress has been made in diversifying, but the 
degree of progress and the patterns vary significantly from country to country. Due to long-term gas 
import commitments and the lack of available import capacity, CEE countries can take only limited 
advantage of changed gas market conditions. But some countries have genuinely benefited from ongoing 
developments. Transit-avoidance pipelines can also increase security of supply for CEE consumers by 
providing the opportunity to arbitrage across gas transit corridors. Despite many criticisms, the EU has 
taken steps that may help mitigate Russian influence. 
JEL: L71, L95, O13, P28, Q4. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Russo–Ukrainian “gas war” of January 2009 caused irreversible damage to the 
reliability of Russian gas supplies. Concomitantly, a new gas market situation – as 
evidenced by gas oversupply, the emerging role of market-based gas pricing and the 
possibility of buying gas more cheaply than provided by the oil product-linked contracts 
– began to unfold in Continental Europe. This situation has brought new opportunities to 
Russia’s Central and East European (CEE) gas buyers and challenges to Russia’s 
Gazprom. 
Although different regions have been variously affected, even within Europe, the 
global gas market picture has changed significantly (Stern and Rogers, 2011). Since the 
end of 2008, a “two price” or “hybrid price” market – where historical oil (product)-
linked and emerging market (hub-based) pricing coexist – has been evident in 
Continental Europe (Stern and Rogers, 2011, 2013). The role of pricing hubs has started 
to grow. In 2009, due to both gas oversupply and relatively high oil (product) prices, 
hub-based gas prices were witnessed well below oil product-indexed prices in long-term 
supply contracts (LTSC). Until the end of 2013, the gap was narrowing. But in 2014, it 
first widened and then narrowed again. Due to falling oil prices (starting in June 2014), 
market gas prices might exceed oil product-linked gas prices in Europe in 2015 
(Korchemkin, 2014). 
In each year between 2009 and 2014, except for 2010, gas consumption fell in 
Europe. As Stern argues, Europe appears to have entered a “dark age of gas” rather than 
a “golden age” (House of Lords, 2012). After the Fukushima nuclear disaster and the 
subsequent decisions on nuclear power plants, at present, apart from the weather 
conditions, European gas demand has been driven by economic problems, relatively 
high gas prices (compared to low coal, electricity and carbon prices), strong growth in 
subsidised renewables and gains in energy efficiency (IEA, 2012b, 2013a).1 
                                                 
Country codes: AL – Albania; AT – Austria; BG – Bulgaria; BY – Belarus; CZ – Czech Republic; DE – 
Germany; EE – Estonia; FI – Finland; GR – Greece; HR – Croatia; BA – Bosnia and Herzegovina; HU – 
Hungary; IT – Italy; KV – Kosovo; LT – Lithuania; LV – Latvia; MD – Moldova; ME – Montenegro; NO – 
Norway; PL – Poland; QA – Qatar; RS – Serbia; RU – Russia; SI – Slovenia; SK – Slovakia; TR – Turkey; UA – 
Ukraine. 
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High oil product-linked contract prices have clearly been curbing gas demand. Gas-
fired power generating plants are at risk in Europe, as well as in the CEE region. Finally, 
since 2010, Gazprom has granted various concessions regarding its LTSCs. Reflecting 
lower European gas demand and Gazprom’s prices compared to those of competitors, 
Gazprom Export, a wholly owned subsidiary of Gazprom, saw its gas exports to non-
FSU2 Europe fall in 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2014 (see Table S1 in the Supplementary 
material).3 Finally, in 2013, Gazprom Export’s gas exports exceeded the 2008 level for 
one year (a coincident record high that was unsustainable), mainly due to increased 
West European imports. Regardless of the cold winter and price discounts (also 
including rebates, i.e. retroactive payments) from Gazprom, Russia has benefited from 
the decline in European gas supplies from Norway (presumably still a temporary 
phenomenon) and the UK (a general trend) and the complicated situation in Algeria and 
Libya (Natural Gas Europe, 2013b), as well as from high LNG prices, also reflected in 
falling European LNG imports (see footnote 1). 
But even in 2012, Russia remained the EU’s principal external source of pipeline 
supply, ahead of Norway (which is also a minor LNG exporter to the EU), even though 
Norway’s gas exports temporarily displaced Russia’s.4 Algeria ranks as the third-largest 
supplier to the EU, shipping both via pipeline and LNG. In fourth place, Qatar is Europe’s 
leading LNG provider. 
61% of the gas in Europe was sold at hub prices in 2014 (Anadolu Agency, 2015). 
Gazprom and Algeria’s Sonatrach refuse to accept changes in price formulation. While 
the share of spot gas indexation in the export portfolio of Norway’s Statoil has 
substantially increased, it has hardly changed in Gazprom’s contracts, despite price 
reviews and the introduction of some hub pricing (Gazprom, 2013f; Reuters, 2013a). 
Gazprom concentrates on other price adjustment mechanisms, including the reduction 
of the base price (a constant in the gas price formula) and the payment of rebates. Stern 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 The US shale gas revolution increased European gas supply (e.g. by European imports of LNG cargoes 
that were originally destined for the US), but has reduced European gas demand (i.e. more coal has been 
exported to Europe from the US) (see Konoplyanik, 2012; GIIGNL, 2013, 2014; Natural Gas Europe, 
2012a). Europe’s LNG imports declined each year between 2012 and 2014. 
2 FSU – former Soviet Union. 
3 The gas interruption during the Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2009 also played a role in the 
sharp decline in 2009. 
4 According to Eurostat (2015a), IEA (2013b) and Eurogas (2013). Due to methodological differences, BP 
(2014) data show that Norway overtook Russia as the main supplier to the EU in 2012. 
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and Rogers (2013) argue that Gazprom wants to retain traditional oil product-indexed 
LTSCs because they provide the highest prices.5 However, as Stern and Rogers (2011) 
note, the position of some smaller markets, especially in South-East Europe, is different 
from that in other parts of Continental Europe, because they are still burning significant 
quantities of oil products in stationary sectors and have retained greater switchable 
capacity from gas to oil products. 
Dependence on Russian gas sources and Western CIS6 transit states (including 
Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) is a crucial issue in CEE and drives an important part of 
the economic, social and political discussion. Clearly understanding how Russian gas 
import dependence is evolving is thus essential for the development of adequate policy 
measures. 
The main objectives of this paper are to (1) assess the degree of CEE dependence on 
Russian gas and the Western CIS transit countries, and (2) gain an insight of what has 
been done to reduce dependency in CEE since the Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis of January 
2009. I assess whether any CEE countries have benefited from the opportunities 
emerging from the new gas market situation and, if not, what factors have prevented 
them from doing so. 
Unlike other studies (such as Ćwiek-Karpowicz and Kałan, 2013; Giamouridis and 
Paleoyannis, 2011; Kaderják, 2011; Kosse, 2013; Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009, 2012; Noël, 
2008; Świątkowska, 2011), this paper provides an analysis of the dependence and 
diversification of all 14 gas importing CEE countries (see Fig. A1 in the Appendix)7 on 
Russian gas and the Western CIS transit countries from a comparative perspective using 
a broad range of relevant evaluation criteria. The aim in this analysis is to avoid 
simplifications. Complex indices such as that developed by Le Coq and Paltseva (2009) 
and applied, for example, by Cohen et al. (2011) and the European Commission (2014), 
have their place. But complex indices are often fraught with complications and 
                                                 
5 However, as witnessed, there is no guarantee that oil product-indexed gas prices will always be higher. 
6 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) denotes the non-Baltic (non-EU) former Soviet Union (or 
post-Soviet) states. 
7 All of them are either EU Members or Energy Community Contracting Parties. Albania, Montenegro and 
Kosovo do not import gas at all. They have no import capacity and no gas is used in Montenegro and 
Kosovo. While no gas infrastructure exists in Montenegro, both the gas pipeline between Macedonia and 
Kosovo and the transmission pipeline system in Kosovo were destroyed. Albania’s industrial sector 
consumes domestically produced gas (Energy Community Secretariat, 2013). 
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frequently rely on important over-simplifications (these complications are discussed in 
detail in Section 3.1). 
Thus the key goal herein is to develop a more sophisticated, well-documented and 
more reliable image of the current state of affairs under the new gas market situation, 
and thus to gain a better understanding of what factors truly define CEE dependence and 
diversification. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology and applied 
data. Section 3 presents and discusses empirical results. First, an introductory 
assessment of CEE dependence on Russian gas imports is given, revealing problems with 
measurement (Section 3.1). Then, CEE diversification is addressed through gas demand 
(Section 3.2), gas production (Section 3.3), transit diversification (Section 3.4) and 
source diversification (Section 3.5). Conclusions and policy implications are drawn in 
Section 4. 
 
 
2. Methodology and data 
 
CEE achievements can only be understood in the context of relatively complex 
definitions of the concept of “(inter)dependence/independence”, “security of supply” 
and “diversification”. Geopolitical issues are not considered in this paper. 
Definitions of security of supply are primarily based on “availability” and “prices” 
(Löschel et al., 2010). Given limited purchasing power, price is a very important factor 
for CEE consumers. Import dependence/security risks include risks related to source, 
transit and facility dependence/security8 (Stern, 2002). According to Stern (2002), the 
two major dimensions of these risks are: (1) the operational security of gas markets 
                                                 
8 The latter represents the risks that come from the destruction of a facility. Technical risk is one of several 
supply security risks (technical, political, regulatory, economic and environmental) also mentioned by the 
IEA (2004). 
- 6 - 
Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market 
Conditions 
 
 
versus strategic security;9 and (2) short-term supply availability versus long-term 
adequacy of supply and the infrastructure for delivering this supply to markets. In 
contrast, Kaderják (2011) distinguishes between three time horizons: (1) short-term 
security of supply (import disruptions that are resolved within two weeks), (2) medium-
term security of supply (adequacy of the transportation and storage infrastructure to 
deal with the trend and seasonality of consumption) and (3) long-term security of 
supply (risks in regulation and market design; import source diversity).10 
Diversification is seen as a key to enhancing security of supply. But, as Stern argues, it 
alone does not inevitably lead to supply security (Rausch, 2012). This means security of 
supply is more than diversity but, as Stirling (2010) describes, diversity is also more 
than security of supply. 
Possible domestic diversification options include (1) reduced gas consumption, (2) 
increased gas production and (3) sectoral diversification11 on the basis of fuels/energy 
produced domestically. External diversification consists of (1) gas import source 
diversification, (2) transit/route diversification and (3) sectoral diversification based on 
imported fuels.12 
There is, however, no one optimal CEE diversification choice (or mix). There are only 
different sets of choices, not to mention the very large variation in the idiosyncratic 
economic and political considerations each country faces based on availability and price 
(and real and perceived risks), with uncertain and different rewards both in the short 
and long term. 
A combination of several types of domestic and external diversification options may 
represent the most desirable solution for individual CEE countries. To illustrate the 
degree of complexity of CEE choices and, in order to illustrate the difficulty of deriving a 
                                                 
9 Operational security refers to the daily and seasonal stresses and strains of extreme weather and other 
operational problems. Strategic security includes catastrophic failure of major supply sources and 
facilities (Stern, 2002). 
10 Long-term security of supply includes systematic vulnerabilities to hard-to-quantify disruptive events 
beyond the investment cycle. 
11 Sectoral diversification, also called fuel mix, fuel type or energy-source diversification, supports efforts 
to move away from gas in the energy balance. 
12 I interpret the definitions introduced by Balmaceda (2008, 2013) somewhat differently, as transit 
diversification is also incorporated into external diversification options and sectoral diversification can be 
divided into two parts. 
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hierarchy of dependence and diversification from any single number, I provide a flow 
chart of different potential CEE diversification options (Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1. A CEE diversification scheme for Russian gas imports. 
Source: Own compilation, partly based on Balmaceda (2008, 2013) and Stern (2002). 
 
Gas source diversification may refer not only to other countries/regions 
(geographical diversification) but also to other companies with or without geographical 
diversification. Purchasing gas from a non-Russian supplier can occur either through 
physical or contractual diversification. Contractual diversification is a type of 
geographical diversification whereby, compared to physical diversification, under 
normal (i.e. non-emergency) conditions, Russian-origin gas is typically delivered, 
although physical delivery from the non-Russian gas exporting country is also 
possible.13 
                                                 
13 If Russian gas is not physically available, for example during a Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis, the 
contracted volumes will be delivered from other gas sources. “Contractual diversification” is used 
similarly to Stern (2002), but differently from Balmaceda (2008, 2013). According to Balmaceda (2008, 
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This highlights that Russian gas plays an even greater role in CEE. Buying gas from 
other Russian suppliers is not possible because Gazprom holds an almost exclusive right 
to export pipeline gas from Russia.14 CEE consumers are also unable to buy gas directly 
from Central Asia transited through Russia because no free transit is provided. Thus in 
order to purchase Central Asian gas, transit diversification (avoiding Russia) is 
necessary.15 For a period, until the end of 2008, a special diversification method was 
used by certain CEE countries, i.e. buying gas from Central Asia through intermediary 
companies at a cheaper price (such as through the controversial Russo–Ukrainian 
Rosukrenergo into Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Romania).16 
In order to reduce risks associated with Russo–Ukrainian disputes, Russia has been 
diversifying its transit routes to Europe via undersea pipelines bypassing Ukraine. 
Among external diversification options, source diversification is of a higher order 
than mere route diversification.17 And among source diversification choices, 
geographical diversification without Russian involvement, either physical or contractual 
diversification, is preferable. 
The vision or goal of energy independence arises from time to time in certain CEE 
countries. I argue that two definitions, a hard and a soft one, are used in CEE. While the 
hard definition refers to “independence from energy imports” or “self-sufficiency”, the 
soft definition refers to import source diversity, in order to reduce reliance on unstable 
and unfriendly nations (Branko, 2012; Stelzer, 2009).18 As Cohen et al. (2011: 4860) 
                                                                                                                                                        
2013), contractual diversification refers to a variety of contractual relationships, either in terms of 
companies or type of contracts (short-term, long-term, etc.) without geographical diversification. 
14 Also, see Itera’s role in the Baltic States in Note (a) below Table A1 in the Appendix. Gazprom’s almost 
exclusive right to export liquefied natural gas (LNG) was partially revoked in December 2013. 
15 Gazprom Schweiz AG (formerly ZMB Schweiz AG), wholly owned by the Gazprom Group, re-exports 
Central Asian gas to CEE (including Serbia and Macedonia in 2012; Serbia, Macedonia, Romania and 
Croatia in 2013; Macedonia, Romania, Croatia and Hungary in 2014, see Gazprom Schweiz, 2013; Gazprom 
Germania, 2013, 2014, 2015). Gazprom Export noted that since 2014, Gazprom Schweiz had not been 
exporting gas to Serbia (Gazprom Export Communications Team, personal communication, 30 and 31 July 
2015). (See footnote 28.) Naturally, it is impossible to separate molecules originating in Central Asia and 
Russia from each other. 
16 This gas was transited through Russia. And Russians played different roles in, and took advantage in 
different obscure ways of, these transactions. 
17 However, due to the EU’s third-party access rules, route diversification may provide infrastructure for 
source diversification. 
18 For example, approved in June 2012, Lithuania’s National Energy Independence Strategy (2012) implies 
the soft definition because the initiative also includes import source diversification (i.e. LNG supplies and 
an interconnection with Poland in the gas sector). In contrast, the Romanian explanation refers to the hard 
definition (see Section 3.3). 
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outline, “policy makers often equate the attainment of energy security with [the hard 
definition of] energy independence”. But, as Bazilian et al. (2013) conclude, this aim can 
promote suboptimal policy choices. 
Dependence of the consumer on the supplier is not a unilateral phenomenon, but 
rather a mutual one (i.e. interdependence). Except for some LNG exports, Gazprom is 
locked into the European and post-Soviet markets, and depends on the export revenues. 
However, this is an asymmetric form of interdependence between Russia and Europe 
because Russia can, in principle, stop deliveries and manage a period of time without 
export revenues. And a consumer nation often has limited possibilities for the short 
term (Sutela, 2012: 110). But except for the incident with Estonia in 1993, an 
unsuccessful one-day gas cut to change Estonia’s citizenship policies, Russia has never 
engaged in a direct “gas war” in non-CIS Europe (Grigas, 2012). 
This paper concentrates mainly on long-term security of supply (along security of 
supply dimensions) as well as domestic gas demand and production, transit 
diversification and source diversification (among diversification options).19 
In order to assess the role of Russian imports, I analyse: 
(1) Import, consumption and production data (sources: Gazprom, BP, IEA, Eurostat, 
national energy regulators, other national statistics and gas importing companies); 
(2) Contractual information (sources: Gazprom, national energy regulators, gas 
importing companies and various media sources); 
(3) Infrastructure data (sources: TSOs,20 gas importing companies, national energy 
regulators, ministries and other indicated sources). 
To complete these three strands of analysis, I have undertaken extensive personal 
communications and data collection. 
An individual country’s dependence on gas is measured by the role of gas in primary 
energy consumption and the change in its gas demand. CEE dependence on gas imports 
is characterised by current and future domestic gas production. 
                                                 
19 Though I emphasize its importance, the impact of underground gas storage facilities is not analysed 
herein (see, however, Fig. 3 and Fig. A1.1 in the Appendix). 
20 TSO – transmission system operator. 
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I provide information on when each LTSC with Gazprom expires, whether CEE 
countries have signed new contracts with Gazprom under the new circumstances, and 
for how many years. 
Further, I collect data on the number of pipelines, and from how many different 
directions, a particular country receives gas. Infrastructure developments are 
characterised by how much progress has been made with the long-standing, unresolved 
issues of (1) gas interconnections, (2) LNG/CNG21 import terminals and (3) high-profile 
projects of the Southern Corridor22 since the Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis of January 
2009. I also consider whether state-run projects play a dominant role in CEE projects 
built or under construction and whether these projects have received any EU funding. 
The role of transit through the Western CIS and CEE is assessed by considering which 
Western CIS transit countries a country depends on and how Russian-led undersea 
bypass pipelines (transit diversification) affect transit countries. For this, knowledge of 
Gazprom’s long-term transit contracts for existing CEE pipelines is essential. Because of 
the EU’s Third Energy Package, existing and planned gas pipelines are also addressed. 
Physical reverse flow possibilities through/from the CEE states to Ukraine are also 
noted. 
Benefits from the new gas market situation are considered by analysing whether CEE 
customers have received price discounts from Gazprom (and who has instituted 
arbitration proceedings with the Gazprom Group), and who has managed to buy gas at 
lower prices from non-Russian suppliers than from Russia, thus diversifying away from 
Gazprom and reducing their degree of dependence. But more expensive diversification 
results are also addressed. Gas prices paid to Gazprom in Europe are also compared. 
 
 
                                                 
21 CNG – compressed natural gas. 
22 The Southern Corridor aims at the transmission of gas from the Caspian Basin, Central Asia, the Middle 
East and the East Mediterranean Basin to the EU (European Commission, 2012b). 
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3. Results and discussion 
 
3.1. An introductory assessment of CEE dependence on Russian gas imports: 
Revealing problems with measurement 
There are problems with the use of and reliance on complex indices of CEE 
dependence and diversification. In order to illustrate these problems, Table 1 provides 
data from different statistical sources regarding the share of Russian gas in the total gas 
imports of each CEE country (the different methodologies used for calculating 
“dependence” reference values are described in the caption to Table 1).23 The following 
analysis of these data is sufficient to reveal the difficulties in interpreting dependence 
(and diversification) from such simplistic indices: 
 The simplest case is when a CEE country imports gas exclusively from Russia, such as 
in the cases of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Latvia. The data, 
however, provide no hint to the fact that they have different options for buying gas 
from non-Russian suppliers under normal or emergency conditions.24 
 Russian dependence was broken in the Baltics at the end of December 2014, when 
Lithuania received its first commercial cargo shipment of LNG. In early December 
2014, for the first time, Estonia imported gas from Lithuania. The weak link in the 
chain is Latvia, where Latvijas Gāze will keep its gas monopoly until 2017  
 
                                                 
23 Several problems can arise with complex indices. For one, it is frequently difficult to include all relevant 
factors and simplifications are often made. For example, the simplifying assumption that supplies from 
outside Europe are more insecure than those from European sources is widely accepted but should be 
questioned empirically (Dickel et al., 2014). But even simple statistical exercises, such as comparing data 
regarding Russian gas with country-level gas import data, as well as gas and energy consumption, is still 
methodologically complicated (see Tables S3–S46 in the Supplementary material). For one, different 
sources apply different standards to measure gas volume (see e.g. IEA, 2011b: 304). Second, and more 
importantly, regarding Russian gas, different statistical sources – e.g. (1) Gazprom Export’s gas exports, 
(2) gas sales by the Gazprom Group, (3) the IEA and Eurostat’s Russian gas import data, (4) the gas export 
data of Russian customs statistics, (5) BP’s gas trade movements and (5) data from certain national energy 
regulators and other national statistics – provide different types of data. Even when two sources 
supposedly use the same definitions (such as the IEA and Eurostat for import and export data), differences 
remain. 
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina have access to Hungary via Serbia. Bosnia’s BH-Gas has a framework 
agreement with Germany’s E.ON to supply gas in an emergency. Physical reverse flow is possible to 
Bulgaria from Greece. Latvia can buy non-Russian gas from the Lithuanian LNG terminal. 
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Table 1 
Comparison of Russian gas in CEE gas imports, based on different source statistics (2008–2014). 
Source: BP (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015); IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014); Eurostat (2015a, 2015c); GE: Gazprom (2011, 2012, 2013a, 2014a, 2015a); GG: 
Gazprom (2013c, 2014b, 2015b). 
  2008   2009   2010   2011   2012   2013   2014   
  RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % 
Macedonia BP    0.08 0.08 100.0 0.08 0.08 100.0 0.09 0.09 100.0          
 IEA 0.121 0.121 100.0 0.080 0.080 100.0 0.118 0.118 100.0 0.137 0.137 100.0 0.142 0.142 100.0 0.160 0.160 100.0    
 Eurostat 0.121 0.121 100.0 0.080 0.080 100.0 0.118 0.118 100.0 0.137 0.137 100.0 0.142 0.142 100.0 0.160 0.160 100.0    
 GE 0.12   0.079   0.12   0.13   0.08   0.05   0.05   
 GG 0.1   0.1   0.1   0.1   0.1   0.0a   0.1   
Bosnia & H. BP    0.22 0.22 100.0 0.21 0.21 100.0 0.24 0.24 100.0          
 IEA 0.410 0.410 100.0 0.234 0.234 100.0 0.245 0.245 100.0 0.279 0.279 100.0 0.257 0.257 100.0 0.190 0.190 100.0    
 Eurostat                      
 GE 0.31   0.22   0.25   0.28   0.26   0.19   0.16   
 GG 0.3   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.3   0.2   0.2   
Bulgaria BP 3.10 3.10 100.0 2.64 2.64 100.0 2.16 2.16 100.0 2.55 2.55 100.0          
 IEA 3.432 3.432 100.0 2.604 2.604 100.0 2.608 2.608 100.0 2.764 2.764 100.0 2.485 2.485 100.0 2.708 2.708 100.0    
 Eurostat 3.432 3.432 100.0 2.604 2.604 100.0 2.608 2.608 100.0 2.764 2.764 100.0 2.485 2.485 100.0 2.698 2.698 100.0    
 GE 3.48   2.64   2.65   2.81   2.53   2.80   2.79   
 GG 2.9   2.2   2.3   2.5   2.5   2.9   2.8   
Latvia BP    1.19 1.19 100.0 0.66 0.66 100.0 1.50 1.50 100.0          
 IEA 1.368 1.368 100.0 1.743 1.743 100.0 1.125 1.125 100.0 1.755 1.755 100.0 1.716 1.716 100.0 1.734 1.734 100.0    
 Eurostat 1.368 1.368 100.0 1.743 1.743 100.0 1.125 1.125 100.0 1.755 1.755 100.0 1.716 1.716 100.0 1.698 1.698 100.0    
 GE 0.7   1.14   0.74   1.18   1.12   1.13   0.96   
 GG 0.7   1.1   0.7   1.2   1.1   1.1   1.0   
Estonia BP    0.71 0.71 100.0 0.36 0.36 100.0 0.63 0.63 100.0          
 IEA 0.946 0.946 100.0 0.642 0.642 100.0 0.689 0.689 100.0 0.627 0.627 100.0 0.670 0.670 100.0 0.678 0.678 100.0    
 Eurostat 0.946 0.946 100.0 0.642 0.642 100.0 0.689 0.689 100.0 0.627 0.627 100.0 0.670 0.670 100.0 0.678 0.678 100.0    
 GE 0.6   0.77   0.44   0.66   0.64   0.73   0.42   
 GG 0.6   0.8   0.4   0.7   0.6   0.7   0.4   
Lithuania BP 3.09 3.09 100.0 2.77 2.77 100.0 2.63 2.63 100.0 2.89 2.89 100.0          
 IEA 3.125 3.125 100.0 2.737 2.737 100.0 3.106 3.106 100.0 3.407 3.407 100.0 3.320 3.320 100.0 2.707 2.707 100.0    
 Eurostat 3.071 3.071 100.0 2.690 2.690 100.0 3.053 3.053 100.0 3.349 3.349 100.0 3.263 3.263 100.0 2.661 2.661 100.0    
 GE 3.1   2.74   3.11   3.41   3.32   2.70   2.54   
 GG 2.8   2.5   2.8   3.2   3.1   2.7   2.5   
(continued on next page) 
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Table (continued) 
  2008   2009   2010   2011   2012   2013   2014   
  RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % 
Serbia BP 2.15 2.15 100.0 1.55 1.55 100.0 1.91 1.91 100.0 1.25 1.80 69.4          
 IEA 2.177 2.201 98.9 1.565 1.584 98.8 1.766 1.968 89.7 1.478 1.747 84.6 0.976 1.790 54.5 1.890 1.940 97.4    
 Eurostat 2.177 2.201 98.9 1.565 1.584 98.8 1.766 1.968 89.7 1.478 1.747 84.6 0.976 1.790 54.5 1.158 1.887 61.4    
 GE 2.16   1.49   1.76   1.39   0.74   1.14   1.36   
 GG 2.2   1.7   2.1   2.1   1.9   2.0   1.5   
Slovakia BP 5.60 5.60 100.0 5.40 5.40 100.0 5.47 5.47 100.0 5.33 5.33 100.0 3.8 4.1 92.7 5.3 5.3 100.0 4.3 4.3 100.0 
 IEA 6.266 6.266 100.0 5.834 5.878 99.3 6.098 6.098 100.0 5.907 5.907 100.0 4.801 4.801 100.0 5.509 5.579 98.7    
 Eurostat 6.266 6.266 100.0 5.834 5.878 99.3 6.098 6.098 100.0 5.907 5.907 100.0 4.801 4.801 100.0 5.509 5.579 98.7    
 GE 6.15   5.43   5.77   5.89   4.19   5.42   4.39   
 GG 6.2   5.4   5.8   5.9   4.3   5.5   4.4   
Romania BP 3.50 4.50 77.8 2.05 2.05 100.0 2.15 2.15 100.0 2.56 2.56 100.0          
 IEA 4.321 4.432 97.5 1.979 2.006 98.7 2.230 2.279 97.8 2.659 3.092 86.0 2.469 2.884 85.6 1.327 1.448 91.6    
 Eurostat 4.321 4.432 97.5 1.979 2.006 98.7 2.230 2.279 97.8 2.659 3.092 86.0 2.469 2.884 85.6 1.341 1.463 91.7    
 GE 3.58   2.04   2.27   2.82   2.17   1.19   0.33   
 GG 4.2   2.5   2.6   3.2   2.5   1.4   0.5   
Hungary BP 8.90 11.50 77.4 7.20 8.10 88.9 6.47 7.47 86.6 5.66 6.70 84.5 4.8 5.9 81.4 5.9 5.9 100.0 5.2 5.2 100.0 
 IEA 8.855 11.403 77.7 7.964 9.635 82.7 6.771 9.637 70.3 5.218 8.019 65.1 3.576 8.173 43.8 8.176 8.176 100.0    
 Eurostat 8.855 11.403 77.7 7.964 9.635 82.7 9.070 9.637 94.1 7.951 8.019 99.2 8.010 8.173 98.0 7.767 8.176 95.0    
 GE 8.90   7.6   6.93   6.26   5.29   5.97   5.33   
 GG 8.9   7.6   6.9   6.3   5.3   6.0   5.4   
Czech Rep. BP 6.60 8.61 76.7 6.40 9.40 68.1 8.44 11.54 73.1 6.88 12.03 57.2 6.6 10.0 66.0 7.2 11.0 65.5 4.7 7.3 64.4 
 IEA 7.500 9.573 78.3 6.683 9.683 69.0 7.453 8.510 87.6 9.041 9.321 97.0 7.468 7.471 100.0 8.475 8.479 100.0    
 Eurostat 6.620 8.693 76.2 5.670 8.670 65.4 7.453 8.510 87.6 9.041 9.321 97.0 7.468 7.471 100.0 8.464 8.468 100.0    
 GE 7.61   6.44   8.57   7.59   7.28   7.32   4.76   
 GG 7.9   7.0   9.0   8.2   8.3   7.9   0.8   
Poland BP 7.20 9.80 73.5 7.15 9.15 78.1 9.08 10.15 89.5 9.28 10.83 85.7 9.0 10.9 82.6 9.6 11.4 84.2 8.9 10.6 84.0 
 IEA 7.783 11.202 69.5 8.166 9.954 82.0 9.756 10.895 89.5 10.076 11.790 85.5 9.774 12.248 79.8 9.621 12.473 77.1    
 Eurostat 7.783 11.202 69.5 8.166 9.954 82.0 0.003 10.895 0.0 0.003 11.790 0.0 0.005 12.248 0.0 0.006 12.473 0.0    
 GE 7.92   9.02   9.93   10.25   9.94   9.79   9.10   
 GG 7.9   9.0   11.8   10.3   13.1   12.9   9.1   
(continued on next page) 
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Table (continued) 
  2008   2009   2010   2011   2012   2013   2014   
  RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % RU ∑ % 
Slovenia BP    0.51 0.89 57.3 0.50 0.88 56.8 0.48 0.73 65.8          
 IEA 0.509 1.076 47.3 0.494 1.019 48.5 0.495 1.053 47.0 0.434 0.904 48.0 0.365 0.870 42.0 0.356 0.847 42.0    
 Eurostat 0.509 1.076 47.3 0.494 1.019 48.5 0.495 1.053 47.0 0.434 0.904 48.0 0.365 0.870 42.0 0.490 0.847 57.9    
 GE 0.59   0.51   0.52   0.53   0.50   0.53   0.43   
 GG 0.6   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.4   
Croatia BP 1.06 1.29 82.2 1.07 1.20 89.2 1.03 1.17 88.0 – 0.62 0.0          
 IEA 1.083 1.227 88.3 1.000 1.044 95.8 1.046 1.070 97.8 – 0.876 0.0 – 1.358 0.0 – 1.269 0.0    
 Eurostat 1.083 1.227 88.3 1.000 1.044 95.8 1.046 1.070 97.8 – 0.876 0.0 – 1.358 0.0 – 1.270 0.0    
 GE 1.05   1.067   1.11   –   –   –   –   
 GG 1.2   1.1   1.1   –   –   0.2   0.6   
BP: Flows are on a contractual basis and may not correspond to physical gas flows in all cases. 
IEA, Eurostat: The IEA’s definitions are the same as those of Eurostat in terms of import and export data. The IEA reports the ultimate origin of gas, i.e. the country 
in which gas was produced. Swap deals and spot purchases are taken into account as well. But only imports destined for use in the importing country are 
considered, and only exports of domestically produced gas are reported as exports (Mieke Reece, IEA, personal communication, 8 October 2013). 
GE (Gazprom Export): This gas belongs to Gazprom’s gas balance and is supplied by Gazprom Export under LTSCs. 
GG (Gazprom Group): These volumes include both exports from Russia and sales of gas purchased by the Gazprom Group outside Russia. Intra-group sales are not 
taken into account. 
Note: 2013 data from the IEA are estimates. Russian sources apply different standards for measuring gas volume than BP, the IEA and Eurostat. In this table, the 
original numbers are used (no conversions have been made). 
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(see Table 7). Latvia also benefits from cheaper Russian gas,25 which, besides 
regulations and infrastructural constraints, discourages imports from the Lithuanian 
LNG terminal. Changes in Estonia and Lithuania should be reflected in the 2014 and 
2015 data.26 
 Serbian national statistics for 2014 show Serbia only imported gas from Russia, while 
for two years, 2012 and 2013, a significantly reduced role for Russian imports is 
suggested. For previous years, all statistics include only minor or small non-Russian 
imports.27 For 2012 and 2013, however, a new intermediary (Russian–Serbian 
Trading Corporation a.d.) made up about half of Gazprom Group’s gas sales to Serbia. 
This is mirrored in the statistics for 2012 and 2013 as (1) significant differences 
between the figures for Gazprom Export (the lower numbers) and Gazprom Group 
(the higher ones),28 and (2) the appearance of significant non-Russian imports. For 
2013, Eurostat and Serbian national statistics show significant imports from 
Kazakhstan in addition to Russian imports.29 But as indicated above, no direct access 
is provided to Central Asian gas. Thus Kazakh imports should relate to purchases 
from the Gazprom Group. For 2012, Eurostat and IEA report significant imports from 
Hungary in addition to Russian imports. Serbian national statistics categorise these 
non-Russian imports as imports from other sources/under other agreements rather 
than via the Russian LTSC.30 These numbers may also relate to purchases from the 
Gazprom Group because purchases from the Gazprom Group roughly correspond to 
                                                 
25 European Commission (2015) compares import prices for the first quarter of 2015. 
26 Monthly Eurostat statistics for 2014 and 2015 provide partial assistance because monthly and yearly 
statistics use different methodologies. Monthly statistics report imports from the country of last 
consignment and not the country of ultimate origin, as yearly statistics do. Lithuania’s imports from 
Norway are reflected in monthly statistics, but Estonia’s imports from Lithuania are not. Meanwhile, 
according to the monthly statistics, Latvia imported gas from Lithuania both at the end of 2014 and in 
2015 (Eurostat, 2015b). 
27 Eurostat and IEA show minor or small Hungarian imports for 2008–2011, and also minor Kazakh 
imports for 2011, in addition to Russian imports. Serbian national statistics also include minor or small 
non-Russian imports before 2008, but the country of origin (here Hungary) is only determined for 2010 
and 2011. 
28 Gazprom Export noted that, for some time, gas supplies to Serbia had been carried out by Gazprom 
Export and other companies of Gazprom Group which had sourced gas from its international portfolio. 
Starting from 2014, Gazprom Export is the sole gas exporter to Serbia (Gazprom Export Communications 
Team, personal communication, 30 and 31 July 2015). 
29 Eurostat calls it Russian, while Serbian national statistics categorise it as imports via the Russian LTSC. 
In contrast, only having estimates for 2013, IEA reports only minor Hungarian imports in addition to 
Russian ones. 
30 The earlier Serbian national statistics showed smaller “other imports”, including minor volumes of 
Hungarian imports in 2012. 
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Serbia’s total imports. Therefore, because of the Gazprom Group’s activities, Russia 
had to have similarly large role in 2013 and, likely, 2012 than in 2014. 
 The January 2009 gas crisis forced Slovakia to begin diversification and consider 
security of supply measures. Contracts with western suppliers and import capacity 
from countries other than Ukraine were pursued. According to the data, however, 
Slovakia has remained almost 100% (IEA and Eurostat) or totally (BP) reliant on 
Russian gas supplies. The IEA and Eurostat place the remainder in the non-specified 
category.31 Gas from non-Russian gas suppliers could come from the directions of 
Austria and the Czech Republic. From July 2015 onwards, however, gas can, in 
principle, be bought via the Hungarian–Slovakian gas interconnector. The drop in 
Russian gas supplies in the autumn of 2014 prompted the Slovak gas incumbent SPP 
to renew its contractual relation with Germany’s E.ON. 
 For Romania, the various data sources suggest high dependence on Russian gas. But 
Romania is able to buy gas from and through Hungary using the Hungarian–
Romanian interconnector completed in 2009, recorded in the statistics as Hungarian 
imports. The role of Austrian imports is close to zero. 
 Since 2013, the data sources almost exclusively indicate Russian imports for Hungary. 
But Hungary is also importing gas from non-Russian suppliers from the West. There 
are likewise considerable differences between Eurostat and IEA data for 2010–2012. 
For these years, at the IEA, Hungary has high import figures included in the non-
specified category because the Hungarian administration told the IEA it did not know 
the origin of imported gas from the West (Mieke Reece, IEA, personal communication, 
9 October 2013). For the first time in 2011, and then in 2012 (but not in 2013 and 
2014), Hungary imported more gas through the western than the eastern entry point. 
Due to increased interest, the capacity of the western entry point has been expanded. 
However, not only hub-traded gas arrives from the western direction. With its major 
LTSC (see Table A1 in the Appendix), Gazprom sells gas both from the eastern and 
western directions, the latter via Ukraine, Slovakia and Austria (see Fig. 8). Until early 
2010, import statistics included Germany and France. These meant contractual 
diversification from the direction of Austria via the LTSCs with E.ON and GDF Suez, 
                                                 
31 2013 data from the IEA are estimates, making it difficult to compare data. 
- 17 - 
Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market 
Conditions 
 
 
respectively. The contract with GDF Suez expired, while the one with E.ON was finally 
terminated because it had become a burden on the Hungarian party. 
 IEA and Eurostat data suggest the share of Russian gas imports to the Czech Republic 
had become almost exclusive by 2012, with virtually no Norwegian imports in 2012 
and 2013. Meanwhile, BP and Czech national sources suggest a much smaller share of 
Russian supplies. But while BP indicates significant Norwegian gas and no other 
supplies besides Russian gas, Czech national sources explain the transactions as 
follows: disappearing Norwegian imports are compensated by soaring German and 
other EU imports, i.e. by cheaper traded gas (MPO, 2012; OTE, 2013), and the bulk of 
gas supplies from Norway are sold outside the Czech Republic (ERU, 2011; MPO, 
2014). Another challenge is the difference between Gazprom Export’s gas exports to, 
and much lower gas sales by the Gazprom Group in, the Czech Republic in 2014. The 
reason is that for commercial reasons, Gazprom Group exploits a broad trading 
scheme that involves gas sales on the Czech market to companies from other 
jurisdictions. Gas physically delivered to the Czech Republic is being sold there to one 
company from another country. However, gas is recorded as sold not to the Czech 
Republic but to the country from which the customer originates (Gazprom Export 
Communications Team, personal communication, 20 July 2015). Another important 
change is that more Russian gas is delivered to the Czech Republic via Germany than 
via Slovakia (Free Poland Info, 2013) (see Fig. 8). 
 For Poland, Eurostat has reported virtually no Russian imports since 2010. But 
Russian imports were moved into the non-specified category. The IEA, on the other 
hand, included these volumes in their data as Russian imports. Again, this is a 
situation when relying one source can mislead the cross-country comparison of 
dependence on Russian gas. The fact is that, despite various projects, Gazprom Export 
plays an increased role in gas supplies in Poland thanks to the elimination of 
Rosukrenergo. But capacity expansion on the German border, a new interconnector 
with the Czech Republic and virtual reverse flow services on the Yamal-Europe gas 
pipeline, carrying Russian gas to Poland and Germany (and onwards) via Belarus, 
help reduce imports from Gazprom Export. Import diversification is reflected as 
German (since 1993) and Czech imports (since 2012) in the IEA and Eurostat 
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statistics, while BP counts it as other European imports32 and with smaller volumes. 
These flows will be further supplemented by expensive LNG in 2016 (see Section 
3.5.1). 
 Apart from Croatia, Slovenia has been the least dependent on Russian gas supplies 
and has had the most diversified portfolio of gas importing contracts. But at the end 
of 2012, Slovenia ceased buying expensive Algerian gas,33 which resulted in growing 
dependence on Russian imports in 2013. While IEA data reports the Algerian imports 
until 2012, Eurostat data suggest Algerian import data were not available, a further 
problematic situation, if one relies on only one statistical material. However, at 
Eurostat, total imports should include Algerian imports because if one deducts the 
other imports (i.e. significant volumes of Austrian and minor amounts of Italian 
imports) from the total, then, one always gets the same numbers in every respective 
year as IEA gives for Algerian imports. Austrian imports include traded gas volumes 
with no information about origin, but physically supposed to be mainly of Russian. 
 The most significant results in reducing dependence on Russian gas imports were 
achieved by Croatia, previously almost exclusively supplied by Russia. Croatia did not 
extend its LTSC with Russia when it expired at the end of 2010. However, in 2013, gas 
sales by the Gazprom Group to Croatia were re-initiated. But these are not classified 
as Russian imports by the IEA and Eurostat. For 2011–2013, Eurostat indicates 
imports from Italy, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Austria, Slovenia, Germany and France that 
vary significantly in size each year, reflecting well the different types of contracts, but 
presumably not adequately reflecting the ultimate origin of the gas.34 
This analysis illustrates the complications inherent in relying on single indices35 and 
the need for more detailed knowledge of gas market conditions and developments in 
order to understand the level of dependence. This knowledge should also include the 
contractual relations between CEE gas importing companies and Gazprom. 
                                                 
32 Imports from the Czech Republic via the new interconnector were initiated in 2012. Since 2011, for 
Poland’s European gas imports, BP has not broken down the statistics by country. 
33 Gas supplies from Algeria started in 1992. 
34 In the IEA’s statistics, imports were assigned to Italy, Hungary, Germany and the non-specified category. 
35 Therefore, if such problems arise with the share of Russian gas in total imports, then, the usage of the 
ratios of Russian gas in gas and energy consumption also face such problems (see Tables S3–S7 in the 
Supplementary material). 
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Based on my collected data (see Table A1 in the Appendix), between 2005 and early 
2009 several gas supply contracts were signed or extended with Gazprom for the CEE 
region.36 But several LTSCs will expire in the 2010s as well. Since the fiasco in Croatia in 
2010, the Russians have concluded LTSCs with some companies in the CEE region 
despite the new gas market conditions. Bulgaria signed an LTSC in 2012, as did Serbia in 
2013. Contracts with Vemex of the Czech Republic, and Dujotekana and Haupas of 
Lithuania were also extended in 2012.37 Among these five contracts, the longest (with 
Bulgargaz) is for ten years, while the shortest (with Haupas) is for an additional two 
years. No contracts have been signed for 20 or 30-year periods, which prior to 2010 was 
the practice. 
Table 2 clearly illustrates that while the CEE countries generally pay the highest gas 
prices to Gazprom, significant changes are also evident in price rankings from one year 
to the next. However, the figures and thus the rankings are a bit misleading and do not 
adequately illustrate the buyers’ bargaining positions (i.e. the package deals and the 
extent of alternative sources for Russian gas imports) because the delivery points vary 
from buyer to buyer and the figures are not calculated on a netback basis.38 Rebates paid 
by Gazprom presumably distort the rankings as well. 
According to my data, based on reports from Gazprom, their customers and on other 
media sources, at least 16 of the current 20 long-term contract buyers for the CEE 
countries have received some price discount from Gazprom, either for one year or for 
the duration of the contract (see Table A1 in the Appendix).39 Beyond this, take-or-pay  
 
                                                 
36 The last LTSCs of the “old gas market situation” were signed in late 2008 (with Slovakia’s SPP) and early 
2009 (with Latvia’s Latvijas Gāze). 
37 Haupas extended its contract from the original expiration date of 2013 to 2015. The Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s Energoinvest contract is not counted in this list (see Note (l) below Table A1 in the 
Appendix). 
38 The netback price at the Russian border is determined by subtracting transit costs and customs duties 
from the price at the delivery point. 
39 Discounts may have been given to one of the remaining four consumers, Macedonia’s Makpetrol (see 
Note (c) below Table A1 in the Appendix). But no information is available about whether the other three 
of the five Lithuanian importers have received discounts. Presumably they have not. It is only known that 
in 2012, two of those three Lithuanian LTSCs were extended (they made “additional alterations and 
amendments”, as Rimas Valungevičius of Lithuania’s energy regulator reported on 7 January 2014, 
personal communication). Note that Estonia’s Nitrofert contract is not counted among the 20 LTSCs (see 
Note (a) below Table A1 in the Appendix). In contrast, this figure includes two annually extended 
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Table 2 
Prices for Russian gas in Europe and their rankings. 
Source: Own compilation based on the following sources: a Stern (2014: 61); b Interfax-Ukraina (2013); 
c Izvestia (2013); d Vedomosti (2012). 
 Prices ($ per thousand cubic metres or mcm) Price rankingse 
 2013a 2012b H1 2012c 2011b 2010b 2013a 2012b H1 2012c 2011b 2010b 
Macedonia 493 558 564.3 462 381 1 1 1 2 1 
Greece 469 475 476.7 414 359 2 4 8 7 3 
Slovakia 438 428 429 333 371 3 8 13 20 2 
Poland 429 433 525.5 420 331 4 7 2 5 8 
Bosnia & H. 421 500 515.2 429 339 5 3 3 4 6 
Hungary 418 416 390.8 383 350 6 10 17 13 4 
France 404 398 393.7 399 306 7 14 16 10 15 
Austria 402 394 397.4 387 305 8 15 15 12 16 
Czech R. 400 500 503.1 419 326 9 2 4 6 9 
Netherlands 400 346 371.4 366 308 10 19 20 17 14 
Italy 399 438 440 410 331 11 5 11 8 7 
Slovenia 396 400 485.6 377 312 12 13 7 16 12 
Bulgaria 394 435 501 356 
(391d) 
311 13 6 5 19 13 
Romania 387 424 431.8 390 
(380d) 
325 14 9 12 11 11 
Serbia 386 405 457.3 432 341 15 12 9 3 5 
Turkey 382 416 406.7 381 326 16 11 14 14 10 
Denmark 382 394 495 480 – 17 16 6 1 – 
Switzerland 378 333 442.2 400 296 18 20 10 9 17 
Finland 367 373 384.8 358 273 19 17 18 18 18 
Germany 366 353 379.3 379 270 20 18 19 15 19 
Baltic States    (397d; f) (333d; f)      
Great Britain   313.4 (331d; g) (240d; g)      
H1 – first half. 
e In descending order (i.e. No. 1 is the most expensive). 
f Average for the three states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). 
g There is no accurate price data for Great Britain, thus average spot prices at the British National 
Balancing Point (NBP) are provided. 
Note: A previous compilation made by Vedomosti (2012) argues that these are average prices, including 
European operations. However, there is no available price data for gas arriving exclusively from the 
territory of Russia. In this table, the CEE countries are highlighted in grey. In the first column, countries 
are shown in descending order, ranked based on 2013 gas prices. 
 
(i.e. the minimum purchase commitment) concessions are also evident in CEE. Three 
CEE consumers decided to search for a solution to price disputes through arbitration, 
resulting in a settlement agreement (Poland), successful arbitration (Czech Republic) 
and two pending cases (Lithuania and Poland) (see Table 3). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
contracts (Macedonia’s Makpetrol and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Energoinvest). See Note (l) below Table 
A1 in the Appendix. 
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Table 3 
Discounts vs. arbitration: Arbitrations initiated by CEE players because of price disputes. 
Source: Own compilation based on Gazprom (2013d, 2014a). 
CEE party CEE 
country 
RU party Claim Date of 
filing the 
claim 
Award Date of  
the 
award 
PGNiG PL Gazprom, 
Gazprom Export 
Review of long-term 
contract prices 
Nov. 2011 Agreement (Nov. 
2012) 
RWE Supply & 
Trading CZ 
(formerly 
RWE 
Transgas) 
CZ Gazprom Export Review of long-term 
contract pricesa 
Dec. 2010 RWE won 
(partial) 
Jun. 
2013 
Lithuanian 
Energy 
Ministry 
LT Gazprom A breach of the shareholders’ 
agreement (Lietuvos Dujos), 
demanding recovery of 
damages for overpriced gasb 
Oct. 2012 Pending  
PGNiG PL Gazprom, 
Gazprom Export 
Review of long-term 
contract prices 
May 2015 Pending  
a This should not be confused with another arbitration process. In October 2012, RWE Transgas won an 
arbitration procedure concerning the fulfilment of the take-or-pay clause (and not regarding the prices). 
b This should not be confused with the price discount applied since July 2014. At the end of January 2014, 
the shareholders of Lietuvos Dujos also decided to initiate arbitration against Gazprom. But no such action 
has been taken. 
 
However, Gazprom’s CEE practices have not been well received in the EU. In 
September 2012, the European Commission launched an antitrust probe against 
Gazprom. And in April 2015, it sent a statement of objections to Gazprom because of 
Gazprom’s abusive strategy, including (1) territorial restrictions; (2) unfair pricing 
policies; and (3) package deals in which gas supplies are conditional on achieving 
unrelated commitments. 
 
3.2. CEE diversification through reduced gas demand 
The CEE countries can be divided into three distinct groups based on the role of gas in 
primary energy consumption (see Fig. 2). In the first group of countries, these ratios are 
higher than for both the OECD and the OECD European average.40 The shares of gas in 
primary energy consumption are below these averages in countries of the second group, 
while in countries of the third group gas has an extremely small share in the energy 
balance.41 
                                                 
40 The high figure for Lithuania is a recent phenomenon and is due to the closure of its nuclear power 
plant at the end of 2009. 
41 Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo are not considered in Figs. 2–5. 
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Fig. 2. Share of gas in total primary energy supply in CEE (2013 est., %). 
Source: Own compilation based on IEA (n.d.). 
Note: The different colours indicate different groups according to the share of gas in total primary energy 
supply in CEE. 
 
IEA data shows that in the CEE region, Poland, Romania and Hungary are the largest 
gas consumers (see Fig. 3), with a combined share in total CEE consumption of 58% in 
2013 (i.e. 40.1 bcm of the 68.9 bcm gas market). 
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Fig. 3. Gas demand (1st column, annual, 2013 est.) vs. storage capacity (2nd column, end-2013) in CEE 
(bcm). 
Source: Own compilation based on IEA (2014). 
 
With the exceptions of Poland and a negligible gas market, Macedonia, all CEE gas 
importers consume less gas than in 2008 (see Tables S47 and S48 in the Supplementary 
material). In most CEE countries, however, gas demand reached its peak before 2008 
(IEA, 2008, 2011a, 2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
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Consequently, and taking into account the mostly negative changes in CEE gas 
production (see Section 3.3) and certain CEE source diversification results, with a few 
exceptions, all CEE countries purchased less gas from the Gazprom Group in each 
successive year between 2009 and 2014 than in 2008 (see Table 1, as well as Tables S1 
and S2 in the Supplementary material).42 Romania has experienced the largest fall in gas 
imports and Russian gas imports across the CEE region. Although, as seen above, Croatia 
did not buy gas from Gazprom Export and Gazprom Group in 2011 and 2012, it has 
gradually increased purchases from Gazprom Group since 2013. At the other extreme is 
Poland, with its markedly growing gas consumption and increasing purchases from the 
Gazprom Group. The latter, however, as described above, is strongly related to the 
elimination of the intermediary company Rosukrenergo. In terms of Russian import 
volumes, Poland is substantially out of line. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
are also significant markets of Russian gas, but the rest are small or even negligible. 
 
Table 4 
Gas demand scenarios for the CEE region (% change). 
Source: Own compilation based on sources indicated in the table. 
 OIES 
by Honoré (2010) 
IHS CERAa 
cited by 
Roberts (2012) 
TYNDP 
(2011)b 
TYNDP 
(2013) 
Kantor – Booz & Co. 
(2012)c 
2020/2008 2020/2008 2020/2008 2020/2008 2020/2010 2020/2010 
Min Base Max 
Estonia 0.0  +8.4 +8.4     
Latvia –2.5  –20.3 +6.0 –3.9     
Lithuania –26.3  –15.0 –19.5 –16.2     
Poland +26.7  +15.3 +72.7 +68.3 +22.7 +45.3 +51.8 
Czech R. +2.9  +54.3 +44.2 +39.0 +23.0 +38.2 +60.0 
Slovakia +6.7  +15.5 +11.6 +12.5 +16.5 +24.4 +33.5 
Hungary –1.4 –8.3 +23.4 +6.5 +15.9 +5.3 +26.0 +55.6 
Romania +12.9 +16.2 –20.0 –1.9 +8.5 +17.2 +25.2 +37.9 
Bulgaria –7.4 +21.9 –13.0 +34.3 
+28.3f 
+49.7 
+43.1f 
+41.5 +77.5 +110.9 
Croatia –14.3 +58.6 +33.5 +33.5  +34.5 +86.9 +105.2 
Slovenia –34.0 +30.0 +68.2 +43.8 +42.6 +14.3 +35.2 +42.4 
Serbia & M. +2.0 +39.1 +75.5e +75.5e      
Bosnia & H. –32.5 +100.0        
Macedonia +10.0 +8x +7x +3.5x      
Albania 0.0 –d        
a The information came from a private study conducted by IHS CERA. According to John Roberts, the 
information dates back to 2010. b Final customers. c The data for 2010 is also an estimate. d 2008: 0.0 bcm; 
2020: 0.2 bcm. e Without Montenegro and Kosovo. f The most updated figure for 2020. 
Note: Declines are highlighted in grey. 
                                                 
42 Regarding Estonia and Latvia, much more gas was purchased in 2007 than in the base year 2008. When 
investigating gas balances and data for the Baltic States, one should consider gas storage activities in 
Latvia (i.e. winter and summer supplies). 
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A key question is to evaluate the extent of additional gas demand in the CEE region. 
Table 4, however, illustrates that the forecasts are contradictory. However, the 
magnitude of the ongoing infrastructure projects does not support optimistic 
expectations regarding additional gas demand. Nonetheless, Poland’s importance is 
incontestable, despite TYNDP43 (2011), which exhibited the highest growth in absolute 
terms in the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
 
3.3. CEE diversification efforts through domestic production 
In CEE, only Romania has substantial gas production (10.6 bcm of the CEE total of 
21.9 bcm in 2013). But gas production in Poland, Croatia and Hungary must also be 
mentioned (see Fig. 4). Romania and Croatia have been largely self-sufficient, 
respectively producing 84.1% and 70.4% of gas consumed domestically in 2013 (see Fig. 
5). 
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Fig. 4. Gas production in CEE (2013 est., bcm). 
Source: See Fig. 4. 
a Compare this (i.e. 6.2 bcm) with other data sources. For example, due to methodological differences, 
according to BP (2014), domestic gas production was 4.2 bcm in 2013. 
Note: The different colours indicate different groups according to the level of gas production in CEE. 
 
Total CEE gas production has been declining. But a few countries have managed to 
increase their gas production (see Tables S49 and S50 in the Supplementary material). 
                                                 
43 The Community-wide Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP) and the six Gas Regional 
Investment Plans (GRIP; there are six regional groups with partial overlaps) are published every two 
years by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG), and the European 
TSOs, respectively. 
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Fig. 5. Self-sufficiency in gas in CEE (2013 est., %). 
Source: See Fig. 3. 
Note: The different colours mean different groups according to the self-sufficiency in gas in CEE. 
 
Many hope unconventional gas will bring competition to the Russian-dominated CEE 
markets, and thus lower gas prices. However, Bulgaria is now focusing on Black Sea gas. 
Romania has maintained its focus on both, but is also supposed to focus only on Black 
Sea gas. 
Shale gas was regarded as a genuine prospect, not only in Poland, but also in Romania 
and Bulgaria (House of Lords, 2012), but has so far failed. In Poland, there have been 
several negative signals, including low(er) resource assessments (see Fig. 6) and 
decisions by foreign companies to pull out after disappointing results. Gény (2010) 
suggests that Polish projects will not be cost competitive with imports over the next 
decade. 
 
US DOE/EIA 
(April 2011) 
> 
US DOE/EIA 
(June 2013) 
> 
Polish Geological Institute 
(March 2012) 
> 
USGS 
(July 2012) 
Fig. 6. Shale gas resource assessments in Poland by different institutions. 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
Environmental resistance is a centrepiece of the future of shale gas in Europe (House 
of Lords, 2012). In January 2012, after witnessing several protests throughout the 
country, hydraulic fracturing for shale gas exploration and extraction was banned and 
Chevron’s exploration permit was revoked in Bulgaria. Shale gas is still not back on the 
agenda, prompting Chevron to pull out of the market. In Romania, after the de facto but 
not de jure moratorium on hydraulic fracturing for shale gas exploration and 
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exploitation, Chevron, the only player, has faced local resistance despite government 
consent. After completing its first resource assessment, Chevron decided to cease its 
activities. Similarly, there is only a de facto moratorium in the Czech Republic. In 
Lithuania, Chevron, the only participant in, and winner of, the shale gas exploration 
tender, withdrew its bid in October 2013 due to tax and regulatory hurdles. Thus 
Chevron has given up its shale gas plans for all CEE countries. 
According to TYNDP (2013), domestic gas production is expected to decline in all CEE 
countries.44 Moreover, no unconventional gas production is foreseen for the examined 
period up to 2022.45 However, investigating a narrower range of CEE countries (see 
Table 4), Kantor – Booz & Co. (2012) proposed an additional scenario that included the 
possibility of shale gas production in Poland commencing in 2020. In its Golden Rules 
Case or best-case scenario, the IEA (2012a) predicted unconventional gas production in 
the EU will be led by Poland, starting in the middle of the 2010s. Poland wants the state-
controlled PGNiG company to double gas production with both conventional and 
unconventional gas by 2019 (Reuters, 2012). In September 2011, Polish Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk believed Poland would basically be able to switch to using its own gas 
sources by 2035 (Vzglyad, 2011). Climate incentives are not (strongly) considered here. 
Poland aims instead at eliminating dependence on Gazprom. Romania would also like to 
see conventional offshore gas make the country independent from gas imports within a 
few years. 
 
3.4. Transit through the Western CIS and CEE 
The bulk of Russian piped gas exports to non-CIS European consumers transits 
through Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (see Table 5, fifth column). But there are certain 
direct links, both onshore (with Finland and Estonia) and offshore (with Turkey via the  
 
                                                 
44 In Slovakia, production remains at the same level. GRIPs (2014a and 2014b) suggest Bulgaria is the only 
CEE country with increasing gas production. In Poland and Slovakia, gas production is projected to 
continue at the same level. 
45 Only biogas production is predicted to take place and only in Hungary. Although there is very minor 
early unconventional gas activity in Hungary, so far it has been a failure and only represents a long-term 
possibility. Dániel Magyari, a Hungarian energy specialist, reported that the Hungarian authority had not 
issued any new permits for hydraulic fracturing operations in the previous two years (personal 
communication, 27 February 2014). 
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Table 5 
Transit directions, transit avoidance and Gazprom’s ownership in transmission pipelines. 
Source: Own compilation (data sources for transit volumes: Belarus: Gazprom Transgaz Belarus; Ukraine: 
Naftogaz; Moldova: Moldovagaz; Nord Stream: Itar-Tass (2014); Blue Stream: Gazprom). 
Country Asset Russian 
share (%) 
Transit routes of Russian gas to CEEa Transit volumes 
in 2013b 
 
Via the Western CIS transit states 
Belarus Gazprom Transgaz Belarus 
(formerly Beltransgaz) 
100  via & to  
       1) LT 
       2) UA 
 to 3) PL 
14.1 (N/A)d 
Belarusian section of 
Yamal-Europe 
100  via & to 4) PL  DE  CZ 34.7 (34.7) 
Ukraine – –  to 
       5) PL 
       6) RO 
 via & to  
       7) SK  
                   CZ 
                   AT  HU 
                   AT  SI  HR 
       8) HU  RS  BA 
       9) MD  UA  RO  BG  MK 
86.1 (83.7)e 
Moldova Moldovagaz 50c  via & to 10) RO (see above, Route 9) 20 (19.7)d 
 
Via the transit-avoidance pipelines 
Via & to 
  Germany 
Nord Stream 51  via 11) DE  CZ 23.8 (23.8) 
To 
  Turkey 
Blue Stream 50 – 13.7 (13.7) 
a This column is a supplement to Fig. 10. 
b Transit volumes to Europe are in brackets. 
c In 2005, Transnistria’s stake (13.44%) was transferred to Gazprom in trust management. 
d The reason for this difference is that a portion of the total volume heads towards Ukraine. 
e The reason for this difference is that a portion of the total volume goes to the Moldovan market. 
 
trans-Black Sea Blue Stream pipeline and with Germany via the trans-Baltic Sea Nord 
Stream pipeline) (see Figs. 7 and 8). 
In the CEE region, the three main transit routes via the Western CIS lead through 
Slovakia (Ukrainian corridor), Poland (Belarusian corridor) and Romania 
(Ukrainian/Moldovan corridor) (see Fig. 7). Gas transit through Slovakia reached a peak 
in 1999. Commissioned that year, Yamal-Europe reduced the significance of Slovakia, 
while Poland became an important transit country. Fig. 8 shows transit routes of 
Russian gas to CEE. 
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Fig. 7. Cross-border entry/exit points of Russian gas to Europe and capacity data. 
Source: Nord Stream, South Stream and Blue Stream: Gazprom; RU/FI: Gasum; RU/EE: Estonian 
Competition Authority; RU/EE/LV and BY/LT: ERRA–ECA–PUC–NCC (2013); BY/PL and UA/PL: Gaz-
System; UA/SK: Eustream; UA/HU: FGSZ; UA/RO: Borodin (2013) and Transgaz (2013c). 
Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. 
a See Note (b) below Table 8. 
b Designed technical capacity. At current operating pressure: 21.35 bcma. 
c It is intended to raise the capacity of Blue Stream to 19 bcma. 
d A new project (Turkish Stream) was proposed instead of South Stream, with the same capacity and 
starting point. 
Note: Figures are (or are suspected to be) at 20°C. In this map, the CEE countries are highlighted in light 
grey, while the Western CIS transit states are in dark grey. See also the Note below Fig. 9. 
 
Except for Romania, Ukraine’s CEE neighbours have already provided physical 
reverse flow services to Ukraine (see Fig. 9). Slovakia holds the largest capacity into 
Ukraine, ahead of Hungary and Poland. As Korchemkin (2013a) argues, using the 
physical reverse flow scheme is also advantageous to EU importers of Russian gas, 
because Ukraine helps fulfil the take-or-pay clauses. 
 
PL (2) 
SK (1) 
 
16 + 3c 
9 
(3) 
55 
5.7 
26.5 4 
0.2 
33.5 
5.5 
Main CEE transit routes via the Western CIS (No. 1, 2, 3) 
Entry/exit points and their capacity 
0.2 
16 
1.1 
1.5 
7.3a 
11.4 
93.5 
27.27b 
5.7 
existing link via Belarus 
existing link via Ukraine 
existing direct link (without the Western CIS) 
planned direct link (without the Western CIS) 63 
UKRAINE 
BELARUS 
MOLDOVA 
RO 
RUSSIA 
South Streamd 
Yamal-Europe 
EE 
LT 
HU 
FI 
LV 
Blue Stream 
63 Turkish Stream 
planned link via Belarus 
55 Nord Stream Lines 1 & 2 
Nord Stream Lines 3 & 4 
Yamal-Europe 2 15 
33.5 
63 
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Fig. 8. Transit routes of Russian gas to CEE vs. Russian-backed Ukraine-bypass pipelines and pipeline 
plans and projects to Europe. 
Source: Own compilation. 
Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. 
Note: HR: No LTSC with Gazprom. ME, KV and AL: No import capacity. For a legend of the different colours, 
see also Fig. A1.2 and Note (l) below Table A1 in the Appendix. The European onshore connecting 
pipelines of Nord Stream (NEL and OPAL) and the Gazelle pipeline are also indicated and marked in dark 
grey. The CEE countries are highlighted in light grey. The Sokhranovka–Oktyabrskaya gas pipeline is 
intended to transport gas to Southern Russia without transiting Ukraine. The map shows the latest 
version of South Stream before being abandoned. A South Stream leg planned to Macedonia has not been 
included. Yamal-Europe 2 is not on the agenda either. 
 
3.4.1. Transit diversification pipelines and their effects 
Fig. 8 illustrates Russian-backed Ukraine-bypass pipelines to Europe, including (1) 
Yamal-Europe, (2) Blue Stream, (3) the Sokhranovka–Oktyabrskaya (Russia–Ukraine–
Russia) gas pipeline to Southern Russia and (4) Nord Stream, which was soon to be 
followed by the trans-Black Sea South Stream. 
Gazprom explicitly plans to export gas in pipelines in which it owns at least a 50% 
stake (Korchemkin, 2013b) (see Table 5). In doing so, two options have been 
considered: (1) to buy pipeline ownership stakes in Western CIS transit states (and 
perhaps subsequently expand these pipeline capacities), or (2) build transit-avoidance 
marine pipelines. But regardless of geopolitical concerns, both options could be justified 
by security of supply arguments. First, transit-avoidance pipelines can increase security 
of supply for CEE consumers by reducing transit and facility risks related (mostly) to the  
Yamal-Europe 
Yamal-Europe 2 
Nord Stream Lines 3 & 4 
South Stream 
Blue Stream 
NEL 
OPAL 
Sokhranovka–
Oktyabrskaya 
RO 
BG 
MK 
RS 
BA 
HR 
HU 
MD 
UA 
BY 
SI 
AT 
CZ 
SK 
PL 
DE 
RU 
ME KV 
AL 
LT 
LV 
EE 
Turkish Stream 
Nord Stream Lines 1 & 2 
 existing transit route 
planned/proposed UA-bypass pipeline 
Gazelle 
existing UA-bypass pipeline 
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Fig. 9. Cross-border entry/exit points on the UA/CEE borders: capacity and utilisation (in forward and 
reverse flow) (bcm). 
Source: 1) & 3): PL: Gaz-System; SK: Eustream; HU: FGSZ; RO: Borodin (2013). 2): PL, SK, HU and RO: 
Borodin (2013). 4): Ukrtransgaz. 
Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. 
a From March 2015 onwards: 14.6 bcma. 
b On the Ukrainian side. From the Hungarian side: 6.2 bcma at 20°C (6.1 at 15°C). 
c No reverse flow capacity is available. The figure is only indicated by Borodin (2013). 
Note: Figures are (or are suspected to be) at 20°C. The cross-border point of local significance on the 
UA/PL border is naturally not considered here. The CEE countries are highlighted in grey. 
 
Ukrainian and Ukrainian/Moldovan corridors. Second, evidence supports the 
assumption that Russian owner- and operatorship (or at least a 50% co-operatorship) 
may reduce transit and facility risks across the Western CIS countries, since Gazprom 
can control the gas flows (RFE/RL, 2007) and bring new investments, providing a 
feasible perspective on the use of that particular transit corridor. Thus it would be 
advisable to adjust the Transit Risk Index introduced by Le Coq and Paltseva (2012). 
Whichever option is chosen, EU Members and Energy Community Contracting Parties 
should implement the acquis communautaires (i.e. the body of EU regulation) on energy. 
1) 93.5 
2) 51.8 
3) 11.5a 
4) 3.6 
1) 26.5 
2) 5.7 
3) 5.5b 
4) 0.6 
1) 4 
2) 0.3 
3) 4c 
4) – 
HU 
SK 
RO 
PL 
UA 
1) 5.7 
2) 3.8 
3) 1.5 
4) 0.9 
1) Capacity from UA 
2) Physical flows through UA in 2012 
3) Capacity into UA 
4) Physical reverse flows from/through CEE 
    to UA in 2014 
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Nonetheless, despite its ownership, Gazprom intends to reorient transit from 
Moldova, which could be explained by the fact that: (1) Moldova is not only on the 
Ukrainian, but also on the Balkan corridor; (2) Moldova is an Energy Community 
Contracting Party with an unbundling commitment,46 and (3) Moldova is burdened with 
the Transnistria issue (debt, transit and maintenance problems). 
Nord Stream Line 1, with a capacity of 27.5 billion cubic metres per annum (bcma), 
became operational in 2011, followed by Line 2 in 2012. Gas from Nord Stream feeds 
into the NEL and OPAL pipelines in Germany. The Gazelle pipeline, opened in January 
2013, is the continuation of OPAL through the Czech Republic (see Fig. 8). As a vocal 
opponent of Nord Stream, Poland decided not to connect to OPAL. Russia would like to 
see a third and fourth line of Nord Stream, but no real progress has been made and the 
project was put on hold in January 2015. But in June 2015, it revived the project with a 
preliminary deal (memorandum of intent). Meanwhile, in 2013, Russia came up with the 
 
Table 6 
South Stream: planned partners, ownership and routes. 
Source: Own compilation. 
Country/asset Russian 
share (%) 
Transit routea Comment 
Offshore section 50b RU  Black Sea ( BG)  
Northern branch    
 Bulgarian section 50c  BG  
 Serbian section 51c  BG  RS  
 Hungarian section 50c  BG  RS  HU  
 Austrian section 50c  BG  RS  HU  AT  Dropped in 2012, chosen in 2014. 
 Leg to the Bosnian Serb R.d 60c  BG  RS  BA  
 Leg to Macedoniad 50c  BG  RS  MK or BG  MK  
Dropped sections    
On the northern branche    
 Slovenian section 50c BG  RS  HU  SI ( IT) Chosen in 2012, dropped in 2014. 
 Leg to Croatiad 50c BG  RS  CR Due to the lack of interest by Croatia. 
Southern branch    
 Greece 50c BG  GR ( IT) Dropped in 2012. 
a This column is a supplement to Fig. 10. 
b At the end of 2014, Gazprom agreed to buy the remaining 50% stake. 
c Requirements of the Third Energy Package should have been implemented. 
d Company should have been set up. 
e Montenegro and Kosovo were also said to have the opportunity to join the project, but these sections 
were not expected to be realised due to lack of interest. Romania did not join the South Stream project. 
Note: Except for Slovenia, all CEE participants were state-run companies. However, the route to and 
through Slovenia was dropped before abandoning the South Stream project. 
                                                 
46 However, the deadline for implementation of the unbundling was extended to 1 January 2020, instead 
of 1 June 2016 (see Note (h) below Table 7). 
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old plan of building a Yamal-Europe 2 gas pipeline, which was eventually dropped. But 
Russia again raised this question just prior to unexpectedly abandoning the South 
Stream project in December 2014.47 
The offshore South Stream pipeline would have provided transport capacity of 63 
bcma, with European onshore sections indicated in Fig. 8 and Table 6. In June 2014, 
under EU and US pressure, construction was suspended in Bulgaria. In the end, without 
informing its partners, Russia cancelled the extremely costly project because of the EU’s 
tough position on the Third Gas Directive and Russia’s worsening financial situation due 
to sanctions and falling oil prices (Dow Jones Newswires, 2014). 
The European onshore sections of South Stream are subject to the Third Gas 
Directive, so the problems of third-party access, transportation tariffs and unbundling 
should have been resolved. Unbundling has also been a serious source of conflict with 
Russia regarding existing gas assets with Russian ownership (see Table 7). 
In place of South Stream, Russia proposed building an undersea pipeline to Turkey 
(which is not an Energy Community Contracting Party), with the same capacity as South 
Stream (dubbed Turkish Stream by Turkey). Instead of the expansion and extension of 
Blue Stream, South Stream was proposed in 2007 in order to avoid duplicating the gas 
transit security issues raised by Ukraine. 
The role of South Stream emerged from the new LTSCs concluded with Serbia and 
Bulgaria. With the initiation of supplies via South Stream, Serbia was poised to receive 
much more gas from Russia than before (Itar-Tass, 2013). No similar steps were being 
contemplated in Bulgaria. However, with the commissioning of South Stream, gas would 
have been delivered via this route (Gazprom Export, 2012a). In April 2010, additional 
gas purchases by OMV totalling 2 bcma were envisaged as part of South Stream 
(Gazprom, 2010). Also, in June 2013, Gazprom and EDF signed a heads of agreement on 
gas supply via South Stream (Gazprom, 2013b). Thus South Stream was first and 
foremost planned as a transit-avoidance pipeline, and carrying additional volumes 
would only have been a secondary benefit. However, South Stream was widely 
 
                                                 
47 Yamal-Europe 2 would not be a parallel pipeline to Yamal-Europe 1, but would run from the Belarusian 
border via Poland to Slovakia and would have lower capacity (but not less than 15 bcma). 
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Table 7 
Consequences of the Third Gas Directive on existing assets with Russian ownership in EU-member CEE 
countries. 
Source: Own compilation. 
Country Company Unbundling 
model 
TSO Russian owners of 
the transmission system (%)a 
Date/ 
Deadline 
Poland EuRoPol GAZb ISO Gaz-System Gazprom: 48 Nov. 2010 
Lithuania Lietuvos Dujosc OU Amber Grid –d Oct. 2014 
Estoniae Eesti Gaasc OU AS EG Võrguteenus Gazprombank: 37.03;f 
Itera Latvija: 10.02f 
1 Jan. 2015 
Latviae Latvijas Gāzec N/Ag Latvijas Gāze Gazprom: 34.0; 
Itera Latvija: 16.0 
3 Apr. 2017 
Serbia Yugorosgazh N/A Yugorosgaz Transport Gazprom: 50 1 Jun. 2016 
TSO – transmission system operator; ISO – independent system operator (i.e. the ownership of the 
physical transmission system is retained but it is managed by an independent system operator); OU – 
[full] ownership unbundling (i.e. the transmission system will be independently owned and operated from 
gas production and supply activities); ITO – independent transmission [system] operator (i.e. a company 
with production and supply interests may continue to own the transmission system, but the management 
of the network must be done by a subsidiary). 
a See also Table A2 in the Appendix. 
b Owner of the Polish section of Yamal-Europe. 
c The three Baltic “national” gas companies. 
d In June 2014, Gazprom sold its 37.1% stake to Lithuania’s state-owned EPSO-G. 
e Has a derogation. 
f Has to sell its stake. 
g Latvijas Gāze secured a gas transmission, storage, distribution and sales monopoly in Latvia until 2017. 
The model of unbundling is currently being worked out by the Ministry of Economy and will be approved 
by the parliament of Latvia (Janis Eisaks, personal communication, 12 June 2014). 
h Yugorosgaz of Serbia has not been unbundled properly according to the Second Gas Directive. The 
deadline was 1 July 2007. Being an Energy Community Contracting Party, unbundling rules of the Third 
Gas Directive should be implemented only by 1 June 2016 (Energy Community, 2013; European 
Commission, 2012a). 
 
suspected of also being an instrument to prevent European source diversification 
through the Southern Corridor (see Section 3.5.2) and to put pressure on Ukraine as a 
transit country. 
Transit-avoidance pipelines would create large additional capacity, compared to 
Gazprom’s current supply contracts with non-FSU Europe (a minimum amount of 158 
bcma of gas for 2020 to 2025, see Gazprom, 2013e). This would enable Russia to 
arbitrage across the transit corridors: 
 Belarusian corridor. Gas transit through Belarus and Poland are not at stake. In fact, 
Gazprom has wanted to increase transit through Belarus at the expense of Ukraine, 
which has neither ship-or-pay guarantees (i.e. to get paid regardless whether the 
contracted shipper moves gas), nor Russian ownership of the transmission pipelines. 
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 Ukrainian/Moldovan corridor (Balkan corridor). With the commissioning of South 
Stream, gas running through the Balkan corridor was set to divert to the Black Sea 
corridor (Dobrev, 2012). While Romania was poised to lose its transit role, Bulgaria 
would have become the biggest transit country for Russian gas in Europe (Bloomberg, 
2012). Turkish Stream Line 1 may be utilised for diverting gas supplies to Turkey 
from the Balkan corridor, while South-East European countries on the Balkan 
corridor can be supplied from Turkish Stream Line 2 via Turkey by using reverse flow 
schemes (Natural Gas Europe, 2015).48 But even these two lines have an increasingly 
uncertain future, not to mention four lines. Nord Stream expansion is supposedly 
related to this uncertainty. 
 Ukrainian corridor. The Slovakian transit route has already been negatively affected 
by the Nord Stream pipeline. The Czech Republic is in a special position due to the 
Gazelle pipeline. Transit is only being reoriented from the east-west transit corridor 
to the north-south one.49 Countries on the Ukrainian corridor do not have the 
infrastructure to import gas via Turkey and are not expected to take part in the 
construction of new gas transportation infrastructure from the Western border of 
Turkey (via Greece–Macedonia–Serbia–Hungary). 
Nonetheless, until their transit contracts expire, ship-or-pay commitments guarantee 
all the CEE transit countries (i.e. Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria) will achieve 
certain transit revenue levels (Medvedev, 2012; Sejm, 2010; Transgaz, 2013a; ACER, 
2013) (see Table 8). Despite speculation, Ukrainian transit will be needed for some time 
after its long-term transit contract expires in 2019. 
                                                 
48 In principle, however, 47 bcma of the Turkish Stream capacity would go towards the Turkish/Greek 
border. The necessary transportation capacity in Turkey is also lacking. 
49 According to ACER (2013), based on information derived from the Czech energy regulator ERU, 
contracts for the transit of Russian gas from Slovakia to Germany and onwards have been shifted from the 
existing pipeline system into Gazelle. But Gazprom Export (2013) argues that Russian transit travels along 
the Slovakia–Czech Republic route (from Slovakia) and also through the Yamal-Europe and Nord 
Stream/OPAL pipelines with two entry points (from Germany) (see Fig. 8). 
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Table 8 
Gazprom’s long-term transit contracts through the CEE region. 
Source: EE: ACER (2013), ERRA–ECA–PUC–NCC (2013); LT: Gazprom, Lietuvos Dujos; PL: Gaz-System; SK: 
Gazprom Export (2013), Medvedev (2012); CZ: Gazprom Export (2013), Net4Gas; RO: Transgaz (2013a, 
2013b); BG: Gazprom Export (2013). 
 End date Contracted volume 
(bcma)a 
Estonia N/A N/A (7.3)b 
Lithuania  2015 2.5 
Poland (Yamal-Europe) 2019 N/A (32.9) 
Slovakia 2028 50 
Czech R.   
   Traditional (east-west) routes 2035c 30.5c 
   Gazelle (north-south route) N/Ac N/A (30.5)c 
Romania   
   Transit Pipeline II 2015 N/A (8.04) 
   Transit Pipeline III 2023 N/A (8.04) 
Bulgaria 2030 17.8 (+ 5)d 
a Transit capacity is shown in brackets where the contracted volume is not available. 
b These are gas flows transiting Estonia from Russia to Latvia’s underground gas storage facility (in 
summer), and from Latvia’s underground gas storage facility to Russia (in winter) (Egert Luukas, personal 
communication, 20 February 2014). See Fig. 8. 
c See footnote 49. 
d Gazprom Export (2012b) still mentioned a customer option for an additional 5 bcma of gas. 
Note: The three main CEE transit routes via the Western CIS are highlighted in grey. 
 
3.5. CEE countries on the way to source diversification 
Regarding short-term security of supply, Fig. A1.1 (Appendix) shows that, according 
to my data, seven of the 11 EU Member CEE countries meet the binding infrastructure 
standard “N-1” of  the EU Regulation No 994/2010.50 While EU Member States had to 
ensure this by December 2014 at the latest, the regulation, unfortunately, is not part of 
the Energy Community’s acquis communautaires on energy. 
Not only the January 2009 gas crisis, but also the period since 2008, have revealed the 
differing conditions of each CEE state. The latter has illustrated how each state has taken 
advantage of the benefits of gas market changes in terms of diversification (see Table 1). 
This has depended on the existence of sufficient interconnections (and virtual reverse 
flow services) and LNG regasification terminals, as well as on the ability to purchase gas 
at market prices. Moreover, gas incumbents have been limited by take-or-pay 
commitments on oil product-linked LTSCs. Thus new entrants bringing gas to the 
country have been worsening gas incumbents’ positions. 
                                                 
50 In the event of an outage of the single largest gas supply infrastructure, the remaining infrastructure 
should be sufficient to satisfy total gas demand for an entire day of exceptionally high gas demand. 
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Real source diversification of the CEE region would entail a critical mass of additional 
non-Russian gas supplies to be met by either pipeline or LNG deliveries. Since CEE gas 
import markets are very different in size, a small amount of non-Russian gas would 
bring significant source diversification in most countries (in the Baltics and countries 
south of Hungary). LNG, including future US LNG, and piped Azeri gas (see in Section 
3.5.2) are the most likely supplies to be available in medium term (Dickel et al., 2014), 
though IEA (2009) still suggested that the lowest cost incremental sources of gas to 
Europe by 2020 were to be found in North Africa and the Norwegian Sea. Regarding the 
largest extra-EU gas suppliers, among the CEE countries, the Czech Republic and 
Lithuania have LTSCs with Norway, while Poland signed an LTSC with Qatar. No LTSC is 
currently in place with Algeria due to Slovenia’s contract expiration without extension. 
The future of LNG imports into CEE depends on (1) the physical infrastructure to receive 
these supplies (either via CEE or other European LNG terminals, see Section 3.5.1), (2) 
limitations by Russian or other existing contractual commitments to import (see Table 
A1 in the Appendix) and (3) LNG prices compared to Russian gas (Dickel et al., 2014). 
However, Russia has the option to (1) lower its prices for LTSCs and (2) to influence 
prices by reducing or increasing gas supplies to European hubs. According to Dickel et 
al. (2014), Gazprom can decrease its European border prices to $7.50 per million British 
Thermal Units (mmBtu) (with a 10% real rate of return on a full cost basis) or even 
lower (on a marginal cost basis).51 
In certain cases, the infrastructure is already there to be utilized for source 
diversification and, for different reasons, only the commercial deal is missing. But in 
most cases, one should also provide the necessary infrastructure. The European 
Commission’s November 2010 communication on energy infrastructure priorities 
identified three priority projects in the CEE region: (1) the North-South Corridor in 
Central Eastern and South-East Europe, (2) the Southern Corridor, and (3) the Baltic 
Energy Market Interconnection Plan for gas. 
 
 
                                                 
51 Based on Gazprom’s most expensive Yamal Peninsula gas, and including Russian export duties. 
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3.5.1. Diversification through interconnections and LNG/CNG projects 
As Figs. A1.2 and A1.3 (Appendix) illustrate, there are still no cross-border pipelines 
between many neighbouring CEE countries. Thus, in contrast to the large projects, the 
importance of interconnections is also emphasised. Some recent progress has been 
made. Hungary has taken notable steps in this area. According to my collected data, six 
new gas interconnections (the Czech–Polish STORK, the “German–Czech–German” 
Gazelle, the Hungarian–Romanian, the Hungarian–Croatian, the Hungarian–Slovakian 
and the Romanian–Moldavian interconnections52) have been completed since the 
January 2009 gas crisis (apart from an Austrian–Slovak mini gas pipeline and, naturally, 
also excluding expansions as well as reverse flow projects53). Among the planned new 
interconnections, only one (the Romanian–Bulgarian interconnection) is still under 
construction (see Tables A2 and A3 and Fig. A1.4 in the Appendix). Gas interconnectors 
built or under construction in CEE since 2009 are or will be owned and operated both by 
private and state-controlled TSOs, with a larger share of the latter. Almost all these 
interconnectors have received EU funding. 
Among LNG regasification projects in the region, the Lithuanian project was 
completed, while the Polish one is projected for 2016. Both are state projects. But while 
EU funds have been allocated to the Polish project, only a European Investment Bank 
loan was granted to the Lithuanian one (see Table A4 and Fig. A1.4 in the Appendix). The 
Lithuanian project has linked up with the Baltic gas island, but not the Polish–Lithuanian 
or the Finnish–Estonian interconnector, which are far from being implemented. 
The other CEE LNG/CNG projects remain in the planning stages (see Fig. A1.4 in the 
Appendix): 
 Estonia and Finland, the two potential host countries, were unable to agree on the 
location of a regional LNG terminal in the Baltic States and thus proposed two 
separate terminals. 
                                                 
52 The Hungarian–Slovak gas interconnector was inaugurated in March 2014, but it became operational 
only in July 2015. However, there is no demand for the capacity. The interconnector between Romania 
and Moldova was inaugurated in August 2014, but was first used only in March 2015. 
53 EU Regulation No 994/2010 obliged the TSOs to enable permanent bi-directional capacity on all cross-
border interconnections between Member States at the latest by December 2013 (with some exceptions), 
but has not been fully complied with. 
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 In Croatia, the Adria LNG international consortium project stalled. An alternative 
project, the state-owned LNG Hrvatska, is now seeking both investors (to develop the 
terminal) and customers (to book capacity). Despite the plans, there is no evidence 
the project will go ahead. 
 Another LNG importing idea in the Western Balkans is the Eagle LNG in Albania. 
 On the Black Sea coast in Romania, the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Romania–Hungary 
Interconnector (AGRI) project would develop an LNG regasification plant. 
 In Bulgaria, CNG has emerged as an option. This would clash with the AGRI LNG. But 
no perspective has been given to these Black Sea plans either. CNG is not on the 
agenda and the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR), a member of 
AGRI LNG, admitted that the likelihood of AGRI LNG has diminished as well (ABC.az, 
2013). Rather than to the Black Sea, Azerbaijan prefers Turkey as an export route. 
AGRI LNG would be based on gas outside the Shah Deniz project of Azerbaijan (see 
Section 3.5.2) and would be a diversification project for Azerbaijan (and the Eastern 
Caspian) in the 2020s (Natural Gas Europe, 2013a). 
Besides the expansion of the Revithoussa LNG terminal, two LNG terminals (the 
Aegean and Alexandroupolis LNG’s) in Greece have also been proposed, and a Turkish 
LNG project could also serve regional needs. 
Bartuška (2008) aptly formulated that there is no energy security without willingness 
to pay. But can CEE countries afford to develop diversification projects irrespective of 
cost? Some CEE countries have been buying gas from non-Russian suppliers under 
long(er)-term contracts since the 1990s, even though, under normal circumstances, 
these would only have been considered contractual and not physical diversification. But 
during the January 2009 gas crisis, this scheme worked well and consumers benefited 
from this option (e.g. Hungary had contracts with E.ON Ruhrgas and GDF Suez at that 
time). Typically, however, consumers have paid a price for diversity.54 In 2004, László 
Varró, now a Division Head at the IEA, drew attention to the rule of thumb that, starting 
around Munich, North Sea gas became more expensive than Russian imports and, 
                                                 
54 Hungary was paying about 20-30% higher prices for gas via contracts with E.ON Ruhrgas and GDF Suez 
than for Russian gas (Világgazdaság, 2006). Russian gas was also cheaper than Norwegian when Poland 
had a small contract with Norway for the period 2000–2006. 
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starting around Florence, gas coming from Algeria cost more than Russian gas 
(Világgazdaság, 2004). But the situation has begun to change with hubs and hub pricing 
(see also the Czech RWE’s successful price revisions with its Norwegian suppliers [RWE 
Transgas, 2013]). 
As for LNG, “PGNiG agreed a contract with Qatar for one of the highest prices seen in 
any gas contract anywhere in the world”.55 In contrast, Norwegian LNG prices for 
Lithuania might be higher than Russia’s, but will be market-based and competitive, 
providing bargaining power against Russia (Reuters, 2014). So while the European 
Commission very strongly suspects that Gazprom has been trying to prevent 
diversification and the free flow of gas, in many cases the lack of diversification can be 
explained with reference to simple economic explanations, such as the lower price of 
Russian gas compared to other options (most notably in the Baltic States until 2008) and 
the lack of demand required to make an infrastructure project viable.56 The case of the 
planned Slovak–Hungarian interconnector clearly illustrates that a private company (in 
this case the Hungarian TSO) can be replaced by state-owned participants if the 
expected return does not exceed the required rate of return. But in CEE, diversification 
projects have gone ahead very slowly despite the role of state-controlled participants 
and the possibility of getting EU-funded support. 
 
3.5.2. Diversification through the Southern Corridor 
The Southern Corridor initiative includes routes going through and from Turkey and 
the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as other routes that could pass the Black Sea to the 
EU (both pipeline as well as CNG and LNG options). The Trans-Caspian Pipeline would 
also be a major project in the Southern Corridor. 
Azeri gas, namely gas from the second stage of the Shah Deniz field development 
(Shah Deniz 2), seems to be the only guaranteed source for Europe. The Shah Deniz 
                                                 
55 Personal communication with Jonathan Stern (14 January 2013). A 2009 source states that LNG 
supplies from Qatar might be 30-50% more expensive than Russian gas (GOwarsaw.eu, 2009). Another 
source, with precise numbers, suggests more than 50% higher prices (Reuters, 2013b). Poland and 
Lithuania have only one LNG supply contract each (see Table A4 in the Appendix). 
56 For the delivery of a larger amount of Norwegian gas to Poland, a new pipeline from Norway to Poland 
would have been required. But Poland was unable to find other buyers, rendering the pipeline 
uneconomical (ICIS Heren, 2006). 
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consortium conducted a three-round selection process among pipelines from the 
western border of Turkey that would connect to the yet-to-be-built trans-Turkish Trans 
Anatolian Gas Pipeline (Tanap). In the end, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) was chosen 
(see Table 9 and Figs. 10–12). Apart from Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Montenegro have also supported TAP because of the possibility of future gas supplies 
via the proposed Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP) along the Adriatic coast from Albania to 
Croatia. As for the fate of Nabucco West, Stern suggests that weak demand for gas in the 
region is holding back investment (Financial Times, 2013). Finally, in September 2013, 
Bulgaria, a Nabucco consortium member, gained the opportunity to buy 1 bcma of Shah 
Deniz 2 gas (from Greece via Turkey), the first result of Bulgaria’s geographical location. 
Shah Deniz 2 gas is expected to reach Turkey in 2018 and “Europe” in 2020. 
 
Table 9 
Competition between pipeline projects from the western border of Turkey to Europe on the Southern 
Corridor. 
Source: Own compilation. 
Round Date of decision Winner project Loser project Direction 
1st Feb. 2012 TAP ITGI South of Italy 
2nd Jun. 2012 Nabucco West SEEP Central and South-East Europe 
3rd Jun. 2013 TAP Nabucco West South of Italy vs. Central and South-East Europe 
 TAP: Trans Adriatic Pipeline, the Greece–Albania–Italy pipeline. 
 ITGI: Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy, comprising the already operating ITG (Interconnector 
Turkey–Greece) and the IGI (Interconnector Greece–Italy) project, the latter including IGI Onshore and IGI 
Poseidon. 
 Nabucco West (Turkish/Bulgarian border–Bulgaria–Romania–Hungary–Austria): an already scaled-
down version of Nabucco “classic”. 
 SEEP: South East Europe Pipeline, BP’s 2011 concept (from Western Turkey across Bulgaria and 
Romania to Hungary’s eastern frontier). 
 
 
Fig. 10. The planned route of Nabucco “classic”. 
Source: Own compilation. 
Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. 
Note: Nabucco “classic” was a large-scale version of Nabucco. The CEE countries are highlighted in light 
grey. 
Nabucco “classic” 
Iraq 
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Fig. 11. The losing gas pipeline projects from the western border of Turkey to Europe. 
Source: Own compilation. 
Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. 
Note: For abbreviations, see Table 9. The CEE countries are highlighted in light grey. White Stream, a 
trans-Black Sea pipeline plan from Georgia to Romania, is not indicated on the map because this plan has 
never been in competition for Shah Deniz 2 gas with other pipeline projects. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. The winning gas pipeline project from the western border of Turkey to Europe. 
Source: Own compilation. 
Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. 
Note: For abbreviations, see Table 9. The CEE countries are highlighted in light grey. 
 
Price is a critical issue for buyers. While the Shah Deniz 2 gas buyer E.ON said that gas 
would be supplied at conditions reflecting European gas markets, SOCAR insisted the 
long-term formula would not be purely hub-based, but would incorporate a link to oil 
prices as well (Interfax, 2013). But one of the buyers, GDF Suez, has signed a contract to 
buy the gas at market prices (and not at prices tied to oil products) (Bloomberg, 2014). 
It must be reiterated that diversification alone does not inevitably lead to supply 
security. And Azerbaijan has not yet demonstrated that it is a reliable supplier (Rausch, 
2012). Moreover, new transit risks will emerge. With Shah Deniz 2 gas exports, Georgia’s 
transit role will grow further. Through Tanap (and potentially through Turkish Stream), 
Turkey will also function as an important transit state. The Trans-Caspian Pipeline, if 
built, would make Azerbaijan an important gas transit state as well. And with LNG 
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supplies, the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandab passage and the Suez Canal would 
become part of the security landscape. 
 
 
4. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
Gazprom’s gas market position in Europe has changed significantly. Though opposed 
to hub-based pricing, Gazprom has accepted a narrowing of the gap between oil 
product-linked contract prices and hub-based market prices. Although most of the long-
term buyers from the CEE countries have received discounts from Gazprom, reflecting 
their bargaining positions, they still pay higher prices for Russian gas compared to 
Continental European market prices, and, generally, compared to Gazprom’s prices for 
West European buyers. But due to declining oil prices, Russian oil product-linked gas 
prices could become the lowest by 2015. Despite this, CEE countries should not stop 
moving toward market-based gas pricing and should continue diversification. 
CEE countries can take limited advantage of the benefits of changed gas market 
conditions, partly due to the lack of necessary import capacity, and partly due to the 
take-or-pay commitments of LTSCs. But some countries (e.g. Hungary) have genuinely 
benefited from these ongoing developments, not only due to price discounts on LTSCs, 
but also due to the purchase of gas at hub-based prices from non-Russian suppliers. 
Gas plays different roles in different CEE energy balances and forecasts for gas 
demand in the CEE region up to 2020 are vague and differ significantly from each other. 
It remains to be seen how the falling oil prices of 2014 and the subsequent plummeting 
of oil product-linked gas prices in 2015 will affect gas demand (and Gazprom’s approach 
to market pricing). But lower gas demand could translate into reduced dependence on 
Russian gas imports. Poland is considered to be the engine of gas demand growth in 
CEE. 
Domestic gas production has been declining steadily and the future role of 
unconventional and Black Sea gas remains a conundrum. Falling oil prices could make 
the situation more difficult. There does not appear to be any revolution in the making, 
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but the possibility of having visible results in the 2020s cannot be ruled out. Possibly, 
some Black Sea gas has a greater chance of appearing on the market. In order to see the 
real potential for shale gas, massive drilling activity and public and environmental 
acceptance are necessary. Countries that, in principle, tend to support, and see a role for, 
unconventional gas, must create more favourable conditions (e.g. in Poland). Likewise, 
to mitigate declining conventional gas production in CEE, contradictions between 
national goals and existing regulation must be addressed (e.g. in Hungary). 
Although Russian transit via the Ukrainian gas corridor has been reduced, it still plays 
a primary role. Nord Stream has already begun to affect the transit corridors. The 
Belarusian corridor has a strong position, and ship-or-pay commitments guarantee all 
three CEE corridors will reach specific revenue levels for a specific period. In contrast to 
South Stream, Nord Stream is still only marginally about the CEE region. Except for the 
Czech Republic, no CEE countries have connected to the European onshore connecting 
pipelines of Nord Stream (though there is the possibility of transiting gas via the Czech 
Republic), and no direct legs have been built from the offshore Nord Stream pipeline to 
the Baltic CEE countries. With the abandoning of South Stream, a number of CEE 
countries lost a transit diversification option. Meanwhile, Turkish Stream has an unclear 
future. 
While CEE governments should accept that the Third Energy Package cannot be 
avoided when implementing pipeline projects with either Russian or non-Russian 
participation, the EU and the respective CEE countries should not be cowed by threats 
from Russia regarding physical reverse flows to Ukraine. As long as these deals do not 
breach any contractual obligations, they should be supported. 
Among the 14 CEE gas importers, except for Latvia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria 
and Macedonia,57 10 countries have been supplied by non-Russian gas suppliers. Under 
the new gas market conditions, all of them have had the opportunity to buy gas at lower 
prices than from Russia, but have managed to do so to very different degrees. 
The evidence suggests there are strong economic reasons (including prices, costs and 
sufficient demand) for why diversification has made limited progress. Despite the new 
gas market circumstances, the Russians have concluded LTSCs with companies in CEE 
                                                 
57 Emergency gas supplies during the January 2009 gas crisis are not taken into account. 
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and presumably have preserved the old pricing model. With some exceptions, LNG and 
interconnection projects are moving forward very slowly. In the case of LNG projects 
under construction in CEE, state projects play an exclusive role. In contrast, gas 
interconnectors built or under construction in CEE since 2009 are or will be owned and 
operated by both private and state-controlled TSOs. When implementing an 
infrastructure project to diversify, one or more countries may decide to consider the 
price component of the security of supply measure as a secondary matter. But at the end 
of the day, someone has to pay the costs. 
However, consistent national, regional and European level political support for 
diversification is also important. Despite many criticisms, the EU has taken a few steps 
that may help mitigate the fear of Russian influence, by (1) using its regulatory power 
and (2) providing funding and loans for selected projects. While supporting solidarity, 
the necessary investments should be made in all CEE countries. Given the failure of 
Nabucco West and the abandonment of South Stream, the potential importance of 
interconnection and LNG projects should be emphasised. But CEE countries cannot 
expect the EU to finance these projects alone. They could, however, successfully strive 
for additional funds from the EU (e.g. from European Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker’s investment package). 
CEE countries should accept that regional cooperation is essential in their small, 
fragmented gas markets (e.g. regional LNG regasification terminals). And for the 
implementation of diversification infrastructure projects, CEE countries should 
permanently monitor each other’s gas affairs. 
Obtaining Azeri gas is still key. By the end of the 2010s, Shah Deniz 2 gas could reach 
Europe. But since the Nabucco West bid was lost, it has become questionable whether 
CEE countries, except for Bulgaria, will have the opportunity to receive gas through TAP. 
Although CEE countries are waiting for cheap(er) gas and more security of supply 
with the help of diversification, they should accept that cheaper gas is not guaranteed 
(see e.g. the Polish or the Lithuanian LNG deals) and, as Stern argued to this author (on 
14 January 2013), gas supplies from non-Russian sources are also likely to result in 
security issues, perhaps even greater than those of Russian supplies. 
- 45 - 
Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market 
Conditions 
 
 
While supporting diversification efforts, CEE governments should also be aware of 
the fact that Russia remains the single largest gas supplier, not only to CEE but also to 
Europe (Natural Gas Europe, 2012b). But CEE long-term contract buyers can and should 
bargain with Gazprom. Both the new market situation and the planned South Stream 
pipeline presented opportunities to do so successfully. Having abandoned South Stream, 
both sides have lost an important bargaining chip. Gazprom could easily have shipped 
additional volumes via South Stream, and this would have provided an opportunity to 
lock-in CEE consumers using a first-mover advantage. Gazprom is expected to 
concentrate in particular on countries where diversification still has not been resolved, 
but there are many ongoing attempts to achieve this goal. On the other hand, assuming 
adequate demand, since price is a very important factor for CEE consumers and there 
are a lot of uncertainties surrounding diversification projects and plans, further gas 
price reductions from Gazprom (which have already taken place in 2015 because of 
lower oil prices) could have the effect of extending gas supply contracts (even if other 
options are available) and/or selling additional gas volumes in CEE, despite 
diversification efforts. 
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Table A1. 
Gazprom’s long-term gas supply contracts in CEE and price discounts (Disc.) by Gazprom since 2010. 
Source: Own compilation. 
Buyers End 
date 
Disc. Buyers End 
date 
Disc. Buyers End 
date 
Disc. 
Estoniaa   Czech Republic   Bulgariah   
  Eesti Gaas 2015 Yes   RWE Supply & Trading CZ 2035 Yesf   Bulgargaz 2022 Yesi 
Latviab     Vemex 2017 Yes Slovenia   
  Latvijas Gāze 2030 Yes Slovakia     Geoplin 2017 Yes 
Lithuaniac     SPP 2028 Yes Serbia   
  Lietuvos Dujos 2015 Yes Hungary     Yugorosgaz/Srbijagas 2021 Yesj 
  Achema 2015 N/A   Panrusgáz/Magyar 
    Földgázkereskedő 
2015g Yes Bosnia and Herzegovinak   
  Dujotekanad 2020 N/A   Centrex Hungária 2028 Yes   Energoinvest d.d. Sarajevo 2015l Yes 
  Kaunas power plant 2017 Yes Romania   Macedonia   
  Haupas 2015 N/A   WIEE 2030 Yes   Makpetrol 2015l N/Am 
Poland     Conef Energy 2030 Yes    
  PGNiGe 2022 Yes       
a The fertiliser producer Nitrofert purchased gas directly from Gazprom. In February 2009, it suspended its activities 
due to high gas prices. At the end of 2012, Nitrofert finally reinitiated its gas imports. But these were stopped again in 
mid-2013 (Egert Luukas, personal communication, 14 January 2014; Estonian Competition Authority). No information 
is available about this contract. Also, no precise information is available about gas supplies from Russia’s Itera Oil and 
Gas Company to Estonia and Latvia. During 2012 and 2013, Russia’s independent gas producer Itera Oil and Gas 
Company was acquired by Russia’s state-controlled Rosneft from Itera Holdings Limited (Cyprus). Consequently, 
Rosneft holds a 66% stake in Latvia’s Itera Latvija. Eesti Gaas purchases gas from Itera Latvija, but in small quantities. 
According to a 2009 presentation regarding the gas sales chain of Itera Oil and Gas Company in 2008, gas belonging to 
Itera arrived at Itera Latvija through Gazprom Export, and then, in turn, was transferred from Itera Latvija to Eesti Gaas 
and Latvia’s Latvijas Gāze. Henderson (2010: 70) claimed Itera had an LTSC to supply 0.6 bcma of gas to Latvia by 2030, 
while supplies to Estonia were only 0.1 bcma. Reportedly, in 2011, Gazprom became the sole supplier of gas to Latvia 
and Estonia. If all the above-mentioned points are true, then presumably Itera used Gazprom Export as an agent, but 
under the new system presumably sells gas to Gazprom (DELFI, 2011; Interfax-Azerbaidzhan, 2011). Gazprom Export 
argues the three Baltic States are supplied by Gazprom and not Gazprom Export (Gazprom Export Communications 
Team, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Also, see Note (b) below. Egert Luukas reported (personal 
communication, 14 January 2014) that Gazprom had been storing gas for winter supply in Latvia and, as curious as it 
may be, there was no normal sale between Eesti Gaas and non-Gazprom companies. 
b In Latvia, all import operations are handled by Latvijas Gāze on the basis of an LTSC among Latvijas Gāze, Gazprom 
(and not Gazprom Export) and Itera Latvija (PUC, 2011; ERRA–ECA–PUC–NCC, 2013; Janis Eisaks, personal 
communication, 16 June 2014). 
c Rimas Valungevičius of Lithuania’s energy regulator provided this information on 14 June 2013. 
d Since October 2008, Gazprom has been supplying gas through the intermediary LT Gas Stream AG to Dujotekana. 
e In 2010, an annex to the existing LTSC was signed, allowing an increase in gas purchases. 
f Only due to an arbitration award. 
g No new LTSC will be signed for a while, because unused gas will be available in the following years. 
h Gazprom Export and Overgas Inc. extended the current contract for gas supply in Bulgaria of 109.6 mcm for the first 
quarter of 2013 (Gazprom Export, 2013). But, according to the financial statements of Bulgargaz, it has not bought any 
gas from Overgas since 2013. 
i Bulgaria received a price discount for Bulgargaz’s three contracts (with Gazprom Export, WIEE and Overgas) from April 
2012 until the end of 2012. Moreover, Bulgargaz’s new LTSC with Gazprom Export is priced at a preferential rate. 
j In December 2011, Serbia achieved a price cut for 2012. The new LTSC, signed in 2013, has brought a price cut as well. 
k In February 2015, Gazprom signed a gas supply contract with Gas-Res of Bosnia’s Serb Republic for the period from 
July 2015 to December 2016. 
l Gazprom Export claims it has yearly contracts with both Makpetrol of Macedonia and Energoinvest of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina “which are either renegotiated on a yearly basis or simply prolonged for another year”. Makpetrol signed 
an LTSC for 15 years in 1992, while Energoinvest’s 15-year contract was concluded in 1997. I have assumed these LTSCs 
are extended annually. But Gazprom Export argues it does not disclose any contract details (Gazprom Export 
Communications Team, personal communication, 9 June and 16 July 2014). For the above-mentioned reasons, these two 
contracts were left among the LTSCs. 
m In January 2015, a media source said a more favourable agreement had been concluded (Independent.mk, 2015). 
Note: Contracts signed or extended with Gazprom under the new circumstances (i.e. since 2009, excluding Latvijas 
Gāze’s contract, see footnote 36) are marked in grey in the table. 
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Table A2. 
CEE transmission system operators and their owners.* 
Source: Own compilation. 
Country TSO TSO’s owners (%) 
Estonia  AS EG Võrguteenus  AS Võrguteenus Valdus (Gazprombank: 37.03; Fortum Heat and Gas OY: 
51.38b; Itera Latvija: 9.99; Other shareholders: 1.60) 
Latvia  Latvijas Gāze  E.ON Ruhrgas International GmbH: 47.2c 
 Gazprom: 34.0 
 Itera Latvija: 16.0 
Lithuania  Amber Grid  UAB “EPSO-G” (state-owned): 56.6d 
 Gazprom: 37.1 
 Minority shareholders: 6.3 
Poland  Gaz-Systeme  State Treasury 
Czech Rep.  Net4Gas  Allianz Capital Partners: 50f 
 Borealis Infrastructure (Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System): 
50f 
Slovakia  Eustream  SPP Infrastructure, a.s. (SPP, a.s. [owned by the National Property Fund]: 
51; Slovak Gas Holding B.V.: 49g) 
Hungary  FGSZ  Mol (Hungarian state [MNV Zrt.]: 24.74; foreign investors [mainly 
institutional]: 25.12; CEZ MH B.V.: 7.35; OmanOil [Budapest] Limited: 
7.00; Magnolia Finance Limited: 5.75; OTP Bank Plc.: 5.44; ING Bank 
N.V.: 4.99; UniCredit Bank AG: 3.9; Crescent Petroleum: 3.02; Dana Gas 
PJSC: 1.42; Crédit Agricole: 2.04; domestic institutional investors: 2.40; 
domestic private investors: 4.46; Mol Nyrt. [treasury shares]: 2.36) 
  Magyar Gáz Tranzit  Stateh 
Romania  Transgazi  Romanian State by the Ministry of Public Finance: 58.5 
 Other shareholders – natural and legal persons (free-float) 41.5 
Bulgaria  Bulgartransgaz  Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD (Ministry of Economy and Energy) 
Slovenia  Plinovodi  Geoplin d.o.o. Ljubljana (Republic of Slovenia: 39.6; Petrol Ljubljana: 
32.0; Salnal: 7.5; Ekopur: 7.1; own shares: 4.0; others: 10.5) 
Croatia  Plinacro  State 
Serbia  Srbijagas  State 
  Yugorosgaz Transportj  Yugorosgaz (Srbijagas: 25; Gazprom: 50; Central ME Energy and Gas, 
Vienna: 25) 
Bosnia & H.  BH Gas  Government of the Federation of Bosnia and H. 
  Gas Promet a.d. 
Istočno Sarajevo-Pale 
(Republika Srpska) 
 Share Fund of Republika Srpska: 65.2 
 Pension and Disability Insurance Fund of Republika Srpska: 10.0 
 Restitution Fund of Republika Srpska: 5.0 
 Investment funds and individuals: 19.8 (ZIF Aktiva invest fond a.d.: 16.5; 
ZIF Bors invest fond: 1.45; small shareholders: 1.85) 
  Sarajevo-gas a.d. 
Istočno Sarajevo 
(Republika Srpska)k 
 Share Fund of Republika Srpska: 29.99 
 Pension Reserve Fund of Republika Srpska: 10.00 
 Restitution Fund of Republika Srpska: 5.00 
 ZIF Kristal invest fond a.d.: 23.94 
 Polara invest fond a.d.: 17.95 
 Investment fund Profi-plus dd Sarajevo: 4.23 
 Other shareholders: 8.89 
Macedonial  GA-MA  State: 50 
 Makpetrol: 50 
a According to the last available information. 
b In 2014, Fortum increased its shareholding in both AS Eesti Gas and AS Võrguteenus Valdus from 17.72% to 
51.38% by acquiring the 33.66% stake held by E.ON Ruhrgas International GmbH. However, in November 
2014, an agreement was made to sell the entire stake in AS Võrguteenus Valdus to the state-owned Estonian 
electricity TSO Elering AS. 
c E.ON Ruhrgas International GmbH is planning to sell its stake. 
d In May 2014, the state-owned Lithuanian EPSO-G acquired a 38.9% stake from E.ON Ruhrgas International 
GmbH, followed by an offer to buy the minority-held shares. 
e Owned by EuRoPol GAZ, the Polish section of Yamal-Europe is operated by Gaz-System. 
f RWE sold Net4Gas in 2013. 
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g In 2013, E.ON Ruhrgas and GDF Suez sold their combined 49% stake in SPP (i.e. sold Slovak Gas Holding) to 
the Czech energy company Energetický a Průmyslový Holding. 
h  In the autumn of 2014, the stakes held by MVM Magyar Villamos Művek (Hungarian Electricity) Zrt. 
(49.983%) and MFB Invest Zrt. (49.983%) were purchased by Magyar Nemzeti Vagyonkezelő (Hungarian 
National Asset Management or MNV) Zrt. Hungary’s interior ministry was appointed to exercise ownership 
rights on behalf of the state until 2020. 
i Having a conditional and provisional certification, Romania’s TSO Transgaz is now acting as an independent 
system operator, though it owns most of Romania’s gas transmission assets. 
j Its parent company, Yugorosgaz, owns the transmission system. 
k  Sarajevo-gas appears to be mostly privately owned. 
l In 2012, the state-owned Makedonski energetski resursi (Macedonian Energy Resources) applied for a 
transmission system operator license (Energy Community Secretariat, 2013). 
Note: State-controlled TSOs are marked in grey. 
 
 
Table A3. 
Some characteristics of the interconnections built or under construction in CEE since the Russo–Ukrainian gas 
crises of January 2009.a 
Source: Own compilation. 
Interconnection Country Owner and TSOb Private/ 
state-control 
(P/S) 
EU funds 
(Y/N) 
Project status 
(B/UC) 
Gazelle CZ Net4Gas P N B 
STORK PL Gaz-System S Y B 
CZ Net4Gas P 
KIP AT Gas Connect Austria P N B 
SK Eustream Sc 
CR–HU CR Plinacro S Y B 
HU FGSZ P 
RO–HU RO Transgaz S Y B 
HU FGSZ P 
SK–HU SK Eustream S Y B 
HU Magyar Gáz Tranzit S 
RO–MD RO Transgaz S Y B 
MD Moldovagaz Sd 
RO–BG RO Transgaz S Y UC 
BG Bulgartransgaz S 
S – state-controlled; P – privately controlled (marked in grey). 
Y – received EU funds; N – no EU funds received (marked in grey). 
B – built (have been used, are currently being used, or are ready to be used); UC – under construction (marked 
in grey). 
a This is a supplement to Fig. A1.4 in the Appendix. 
b See Note (e) below Table A2 in the Appendix. 
c See Note (h) below Fig. A1 in the Appendix. 
d See Note (i) below Fig. A1 in the Appendix. 
 
- 64 - 
Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market 
Conditions 
 
 
Table A4. 
Some characteristics of LNG regasification projects under construction in CEE. 
Source: Own compilation. 
Country Type of LNG 
regasification 
technology 
Owners Regas 
capacity 
(bcma) 
LNG 
procurement 
Start 
Lithuania 
  (Klaipėda) 
On-board regasification  FSRU: Norway’s Höegh LNG. 
Klaipėdos Nafta has a 10-year lease 
with a purchase option. 
 Jetty, gas pipeline and metering 
station: Klaipėdos Nafta (majority 
state-owned) 
4a One contract 
with Norway 
(Litgas–Statoil; 
signed in 2014; 
0.54 bcma for 5 
years from 
2015)b 
2015 
Poland 
  (Świnoujście) 
Onshore terminal-based 
regasification 
 Gaz-System (state-owned) 5 One contract 
with Qatar 
(PGNiG– 
Qatargas; signed 
in 2009; 1.5 
bcma for 20 
years from 
2014) 
2016 
FSRU – floating [LNG] storage and regasification unit. 
a To be achieved after the capacity expansion of the Klaipėda–Kiemėnai gas pipeline in Lithuania. 
b To be delivered from the end of December 2014. Litgas also has 16 non-binding master trade 
agreements with other LNG suppliers. 
 
 
- 65 - 
Csaba Weiner / Central and East European Diversification under New Gas Market Conditions 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Fig. A1.1. “N-1” standard and gas storages 
in CEE. 
 
Fig. A1.2. Cross-border points in CEE. 
 
Fig. A1.3. CEE country borders without 
cross-border gas pipelines. 
 
Fig. A1.4. New cross-border points, 
cross-border points under construction 
and LNG projects and plans in CEE.a 
Fig. A1. Existing and planned gas infrastructure vs. “N-1” standard and LTSCs with Gazprom in CEE. 
Source: Own compilation. Blank map: <http://www.youreuropemap.com/>. 
a See also Table A3 for supplementary information. b Without taking into account Lithuania’s LNG terminal. ME, KV and AL: No import capacity. See Fig. A1.2–A1.4. c According to my 
collected data, all the border crossings are indicated on the map (including pipelines of local significance; either transmission or distribution). d In fact, Makpetrol of Macedonia and 
Energoinvest of Bosnia and Herzegovina still extend their gas supply contracts annually. See Note (l) below Table A1 in the Appendix. e The Austrian–Czech border is marked with an 
“X”, because there is only a connection of the distribution networks between Hevlín (CZ) and Laa an der Thaya (AT). f It includes new exit and entry points but excludes reverse flow 
projects as well as capacity expansions. g In certain cases, more than one project/location was proposed. h From Austria’s Baumgarten via the Austrian–Hungarian gas interconnector 
(HAG), the Kittsee–Petržalka gas pipeline (KIP) – an Austrian–Slovak “mini” gas pipeline – connects with the Southern Bratislava distribution system in Slovakia. KIP was completed 
after the January 2009 gas crisis broke out. i The Moldovan party, Moldovagaz is marked with an “S”, though it is half-owned by the Russian-state-controlled Gazprom and half by 
Moldova (Republic of Moldova: 35.33%; Transnistria: 13.44%; the latter stake is held by Gazprom in trust management). j Only a European Investment Bank loan. 
  
LTSC with Gazpromd No LTSC with Gazpromd No import capacity 
LNG – built/project/plang Countries fulfilling “N-1” standard 
Countries not fulfilling “N-1” standardb 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
CNG 
X No cross-border pipelinee Cross-border point
c 
Cross-border point, local rangec 
New cross-border point since Jan. 2009f 
AL 
ME KV 
MK 
BG 
RO 
RS BA 
HR 
SI 
HU 
SK 
CZ 
PL 
LT 
LV 
EE 
AT 
DE 
RU 
BY 
UA 
MD 
TR 
IT 
GR 
RU 
Countries having gas storage(s) 
Cross-border point under construction 
Y 
Nj 
P 
S 
S 
P 
P 
P 
P 
S 
S 
Si 
S 
S 
S 
S 
N 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Sh 
S 
S 
S/P Privately/state-controlled 
Y/N Received/not received EU funds 
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Table S1 
Gazprom Export’s (GE) gas exports to, and gas sales by, the Gazprom Group (GG) in non-FSU CEE and Europe (∑) (2008–2014). 
Source: GE: Gazprom (2011, 2012, 2013a, 2014a, 2015a); GG: Gazprom (2013c, 2014b, 2015b). 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2009/2008 2010/2008 2011/2008 2012/2008 2013/2008 2014/2008 
GE GG GE GG GE GG GE GG GE GG GE GG GE GG GE GG GE GG GE GG GE GG GE GG GE GG 
Bcm Change 
∑ 158.8 167.6 140.6 148.3 138.6 148.1 150.0 156.6 138.8 151.0 161.5 174.3 146.6 159.4 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.94 0.93 0.87 0.90 1.02 1.04 0.92 0.95 
PL 7.92 7.9 9.02 9.0 9.93 11.8 10.25 10.3 9.94 13.1 9.79 12.9 9.10 9.1 1.14 1.14 1.25 1.49 1.29 1.30 1.26 1.66 1.24 1.63 1.15 1.15 
CZ 7.61 7.9 6.44 7.0 8.57 9.0 7.59 8.2 7.28 8.3 7.32 7.9 4.76 0.8 0.85 0.89 1.13 1.14 1.00 1.04 0.96 1.05 0.96 1.00 0.63 0.10 
SK 6.15 6.2 5.43 5.4 5.77 5.8 5.89 5.9 4.19 4.3 5.42 5.5 4.39 4.4 0.88 0.87 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.68 0.69 0.88 0.89 0.71 0.71 
HU 8.90 8.9 7.6 7.6 6.93 6.9 6.26 6.3 5.29 5.3 5.97 6.0 5.33 5.4 0.85 0.85 0.78 0.78 0.70 0.71 0.59 0.60 0.67 0.67 0.60 0.61 
RO 3.58 4.2 2.04 2.5 2.27 2.6 2.82 3.2 2.17 2.5 1.19 1.4 0.33 0.5 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.62 0.79 0.76 0.61 0.60 0.33 0.33 0.09 0.12 
BG 3.48 2.9 2.64 2.2 2.65 2.3 2.81 2.5 2.53 2.5 2.80 2.9 2.79 2.8 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.81 0.86 0.73 0.86 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.97 
RS 2.16 2.2 1.49 1.7 1.76 2.1 1.39 2.1 0.74 1.9 1.14 2.0 1.36 1.5 0.69 0.77 0.81 0.95 0.64 0.95 0.34 0.86 0.53 0.91 0.63 0.68 
BA 0.31 0.3 0.22 0.2 0.25 0.2 0.28 0.3 0.26 0.3 0.19 0.2 0.16 0.2 0.71 0.67 0.81 0.67 0.90 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.61 0.67 0.52 0.67 
MK 0.12 0.1 0.079 0.1 0.12 0.1 0.13 0.1 0.08 0.1 0.05 0.0a 0.05 0.1 0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.42 0.00 0.42 1.00 
SI 0.59 0.6 0.51 0.5 0.52 0.5 0.53 0.5 0.50 0.5 0.53 0.5 0.43 0.4 0.86 0.83 0.88 0.83 0.90 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.90 0.83 0.73 0.67 
HR 1.05 1.2 1.067 1.1 1.11 1.1 – – – – – 0.2 – 0.6 1.02 0.92 1.06 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.50 
GE: This gas belongs to Gazprom’s gas balance and is supplied by Gazprom Export under LTSCs. 
GG: These volumes include both exports from Russia and sales of gas purchased by the Gazprom Group outside Russia. Intra-group sales are not taken into account. 
a Less than 0.05 bcm. 
Note: Light grey indicates (virtually) no change. Increases are highlighted in dark grey. 
 
Table S2 
Russian gas exports to the Baltic States (2008–2014). 
Source: G (Gazprom): Gazprom (2011, 2012, 2013a, 2014a, 2015a); GG (Gazprom Group): Gazprom (2013c, 2014b, 2015b). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2009/2008 2010/2008 2011/2008 2012/2008 2013/2008 2014/2008 
G GG G GG G GG G GG G GG G GG G GG G GG G GG G GG G GG G GG G GG 
Bcm Change 
EE 0.6 0.6 0.77 0.8 0.44 0.4 0.66 0.7 0.64 0.6 0.73 0.7 0.42 0.4 1.28 1.33 0.73 0.67 1.10 1.17 1.07 1.00 1.22 1.17 0.70 0.67 
LV 0.7 0.7 1.14 1.1 0.74 0.7 1.18 1.2 1.12 1.1 1.13 1.1 0.96 1.0 1.63 1.57 1.06 1.00 1.69 1.71 1.60 1.57 1.61 1.57 1.37 1.43 
LT 3.1 2.8 2.74 2.5 3.11 2.8 3.41 3.2 3.32 3.1 2.70 2.7 2.54 2.5 0.88 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.14 1.07 1.11 0.87 0.96 0.82 0.89 
G: Gazprom gas sales are based on management reporting. The Baltic States are treated separately from other CEE customers of the Gazprom Group because these 
three countries are supplied by Gazprom (not Gazprom Export). However, the transfer of functions from Gazprom to Gazprom Export is ongoing (Gazprom Export 
Communications Team, personal communication, 6 June 2014). 
GG: See Table 1. 
Note: Light grey indicates (virtually) no change. Increases are highlighted in dark grey. Differences between the two sources (i.e. “G” and “GG”) are only apparent for 
Lithuania. Group data may not include Lithuania’s Kaunas power plant (sold by Gazprom in 2013). See also Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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Table S3 
The share of Russian gas imports in total gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, %). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a, 2015c). 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Bulgaria 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Estonia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Latvia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Lithuania 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Macedonia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Czech Republic 76.1 65.4 87.6 97.0 100.0 100.0 
Slovakia 100.0 99.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.7 
Hungary 77.6 82.6 94.1 99.2 98.0 95.0 
Romania 97.5 98.7 97.9 86.0 85.6 91.7 
Serbia 98.9 98.8 89.7 84.6 54.5 61.4 
Slovenia 47.3 48.5 47.0 48.0 42.0 57.9 
Poland 69.4 82.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Croatia 88.3 97.1 97.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Table S4 
The share of Russian gas imports in total gas imports, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, %). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Bulgaria 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Estonia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Latvia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Lithuania 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Macedonia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Bosnia & H. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Czech Republic 78.3 69.0 87.6 97.0 100.0 100.0 
Hungary 77.7 82.7 70.3 65.1 43.8 100.0 
Slovakia 100.0 99.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.7 
Serbia 98.9 98.8 89.7 84.6 54.5 97.4 
Romania 97.5 98.7 97.8 86.0 85.6 91.6 
Poland 69.5 82.0 89.5 85.5 79.8 77.1 
Slovenia 47.3 48.5 47.0 48.0 42.0 42.0 
Croatia 88.3 95.8 97.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
e – Estimates. 
 
Table S5 
Russian gas imports as a share of gross inland gas consumption, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, %). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a, 2015c). 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Latvia 82.2 114.1 61.8 109.4 113.8 115.6 
Lithuania 96.3 100.4 99.7 100.3 100.1 100.0 
Macedonia 100.0 99.9 100.1 100.0 100.0 100.1 
Estonia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Czech Republic 75.3 68.2 75.7 108.9 89.0 100.3 
Slovakia 99.3 108.1 99.9 104.9 90.7 94.6 
Bulgaria 96.2 98.6 92.6 86.1 83.3 93.2 
Hungary 68.5 71.4 75.9 70.0 79.6 83.4 
Slovenia 47.2 48.4 46.7 47.9 41.9 57.7 
Serbia 88.3 89.3 75.9 61.9 46.3 49.4 
Romania 28.3 14.9 16.5 19.1 18.3 10.9 
Poland 50.6 55.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Croatia 33.8 34.3 32.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note: A dependency rate in excess of 100% indicates stocks build-up.
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Table S6 
Russian gas imports as a share of gas consumption, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, %). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Latvia 82.2 114.1 61.8 109.4 113.8 100.0 
Estonia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Macedonia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Czech Republic 86.3 81.7 80.3 107.5 89.1 100.0 
Lithuania 96.3 100.4 99.7 100.3 100.1 99.8 
Bulgaria 97.8 99.8 93.3 86.7 83.7 90.7 
Slovakia 99.3 108.1 100.0 104.9 90.8 94.7 
Hungary 67.6 70.3 55.8 45.2 35.3 88.7 
Serbia 87.6 89.3 75.9 61.9 46.3 75.1 
Poland 47.8 51.1 56.9 58.7 54.4 52.8 
Slovenia 47.2 48.3 46.7 47.9 41.9 41.9 
Romania 27.0 14.9 16.4 19.1 18.2 10.5 
Croatia 33.8 33.8 32.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
e – Estimates. 
Note: A dependency rate in excess of 100% indicates stocks build-up. 
 
Table S7 
Russian gas imports as a share of gross inland energy consumption, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, 
%). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a, 2015c). 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Lithuania 26.9 25.8 36.6 38.9 37.4 32.4 
Latvia 23.3 31.0 19.5 32.2 30.4 31.2 
Hungary 27.2 26.0 28.8 26.1 28.1 28.3 
Slovakia 28.0 28.5 28.0 27.9 23.7 26.4 
Czech Republic 11.9 10.9 13.7 17.2 14.3 16.5 
Bulgaria 14.1 12.2 12.0 11.9 11.2 13.3 
Estonia 13.0 9.8 9.1 8.1 8.9 8.3 
Serbia 10.6 8.2 9.0 7.3 5.3 6.2 
Slovenia 5.3 5.7 5.6 4.9 4.3 5.8 
Macedonia 3.3 2.3 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.7 
Romania 8.5 4.4 5.0 5.8 5.6 3.3 
Poland 6.5 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Croatia 9.6 9.5 9.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 
Bulgaria 
 
Table S8 
Bulgaria’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, million cubic metres or mmcm). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Russia 3 432 2 604 2 608 2 764 2 485 2 698 
Total 3 432 2 604 2 608 2 764 2 485 2 698 
 
Table S9 
Bulgaria’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Russia 3 432 2 604 2 608 2 764 2 485 2 708 
Total 3 432 2 604 2 608 2 764 2 485 2 708 
e – Estimates. 
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Table S10 
Bulgaria’s gas imports, according to BP (2008–2011, bcm). 
Source: BP (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Russia 3.10 2.64 2.16 2.55 
Total 3.10 2.64 2.16 2.55 
 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Table S11 
The Czech Republic’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, mmcm). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Russia 6 620 5 670 7 453 9 041 7 468 8 464 
Norway 2 073 3 000 1 057 280 3 4 
Total 8 693 8 670 8 510 9 321 7 471 8 468 
 
Table S12 
The Czech Republic’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Russia 7 500  6 683 7 453 9 041 7 468 8 475 
Norway 2 073 3 000 1 057 280 3 4 
Total 9 573 9 683 8 510 9 321 7 471 8 479 
e – Estimates. 
 
Table S13 
The Czech Republic’s gas imports, according to BP (2008–2014, bcm). 
Source: BP (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Russia 6.60 6.40 8.44 6.88 6.6 7.2 4.7 
Norway 2.01 3.00 3.10 3.85 3.4 3.8 2.6 
Other Europe – – – 1.30a – – – 
Total 8.61 9.40 11.54 12.03 10.0 11.0 7.3 
a Imports other than from Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
 
 
Serbia 
 
Table S14 
Serbia’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, mmcm). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a). 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Russia 2 177 1 565 1 766 1 478 976 1 158 
Hungary 24 19 202 219 814 0 
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 50 0 729 
Total 2 201 1 584 1 968 1 747 1 790 1 887 
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Table S15 
Serbia’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Russia 2 177 1 565 1 766 1 478 976 1 890 
Hungary NB 19 202 219 814 50 
Non Specified 24 – – – – – 
Total 2 201 1 584 1 968 1 747 1 790 1 940 
e – Estimates. 
NB – No such breakdown is available for that year. 
 
Table S16 
Serbia’s gas imports, according to BP (2008–2011, bcm). 
Source: BP (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
Russia 2.15 1.55 1.91 1.25 
Other Europe – – – 0.55a 
Total 2.15 1.55 1.91 1.80 
a Imports other than from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. 
 
 
Macedonia 
 
Table S17 
Macedonia’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, mmcm). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Russia 121 80 118 137 142 160 
Total 121 80 118 137 142 160 
 
Table S18 
Macedonia’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Russia 121 80 118 137 142 160 
Total 121 80 118 137 142 160 
e – Estimates. 
 
Table S19 
Macedonia’s gas imports, according to BP (2009–2011, bcm). 
Source: BP (2010, 2011, 2012). 
 2009 2010 2011 
Russia 0.08 0.08 0.09 
Total 0.08 0.08 0.09 
 
 
Slovakia 
 
Table S20 
Slovakia’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, mmcm). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Russia 6 266 5 834 6 098 5 907 4 801 5 509 
Not specified 0 44 0 0 0 70 
Total 6 266 5 878 6 098 5 907 4 801 5 579 
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Table S21 
Slovakia’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Russia 6 266 5 834 6 098 5 907 4 801 5 509 
Non Specified/Other – 44 – – – 70 
Total 6 266 5 878 6 098 5 907 4 801 5 579 
e – Estimates. 
 
Table S22 
Slovakia’s gas imports, according to BP (2008–2014, bcm). 
Source: BP (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Russia 5.60 5.40 5.47 5.33 3.8 5.3 4.3 
Other Europe – – – – 0.3a – – 
Total 5.60 5.40 5.47 5.33 4.1 5.3 4.3 
a Imports other than from the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. 
 
 
Slovenia 
 
Table S23 
Slovenia’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, mmcm). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Russia 509 494 495 434 365 490 
Austria 216 175 158 199 305 305 
Italy 24 50 53 63 61 51 
Croatia 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Not specified 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Subtotal 750 720 706 696 731 847 
Algeria : : : : : : 
Total 1 076 1 019 1 053 904 870 847 
Total – Subtotal = Algeria 326 299 347 208 139 0 
: – Not available. 
 
Table S24 
Slovenia’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Russia 509 494 495 434 365 356 
Austria NB 175 158 199 305 296 
Algeria 326 299 347 208 139 136 
Italy NB 50 53 63 61 59 
Croatia NB 1 – – – – 
Non Specified 241 – – – – – 
Total 1 076 1 019 1 053 904 870 847 
e – Estimates. 
NB – No such breakdown is available for that year. 
 
Table S25 
Slovenia’s gas imports, according to BP (2009–2011, bcm). 
Source: BP (2010, 2011, 2012). 
 2009 2010 2011 
Russia 0.51 0.50 0.48 
Algeria 0.38 0.38 0.25 
Total 0.89 0.88 0.73 
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Romania 
 
Table S26 
Romania’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, mmcm). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Russia 4 321 1 979 2 230 2 659 2 469 1 341 
Hungary 0 0 49 417 399 122 
Austria 0 0 0 16 16 0 
Turkmenistan 111 27 0 0 0 0 
Total 4 432 2 006 2 279 3 092 2 884 1 463 
 
Table S27 
Romania’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Russia 4 321 1 979 2 230 2 659 2 469 1 327 
Hungary – – 49 417 399 121 
Non Specified – –  – 16 16 – 
Turkmenistan 111 27 – – – – 
Total 4 432 2 006 2 279 3 092 2 884 1 448 
e – Estimates. 
 
Table S28 
Romania’s gas imports, according to BP (2008–2011, bcm). 
Source: BP (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Russia 3.50 2.05 2.15 2.56 
Other Europe & Eurasia 1.00 – – – 
Total 4.50 2.05 2.15 2.56 
 
 
Hungary 
 
Table S29 
Hungary’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, mmcm). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Russia 8 855 7 964 9 070 7 951 8 010 7 767 
France 138 648 440 68 0 0 
Germany 18 383 127 0 0 0 
Turkmenistan 1 937 254 0 0 0 0 
Uzbekistan 455 0 0 0 0 0 
Not specified 0 386 0 0 163 409 
Total 11 403 9 635 9 637 8 019 8 173 8 176 
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Table S30 
Hungary’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Russia 8 855 7 964 6 771 5 218 3 576 8 176 
Germany 18 383 127 – – – 
France 138 648 440 68 – – 
Non Specified/Other – 386 2 299 2 733 4 597 – 
Turkmenistan 1 937 254 – – – – 
Uzbekistan 455 – – – – – 
Total 11 403 9 635 9 637 8 019 8 173 8 176 
e – Estimates. 
 
Table S31 
Hungary’s gas imports, according to BP (2008–2014, bcm). 
Source: BP (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Russia 8.90 7.20 6.47 5.66 4.8 5.9 5.2 
France NB 0.20 0.70 NB NB – – 
Germany 2.10 0.70 0.30 NB NB – – 
Other Europe NB – – 1.04a 1.1b – – 
Other Europe & Eurasia 0.50c – – NB NB – – 
Total 11.50 8.10 7.47 6.70 5.9 5.9 5.2 
a Imports other than from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. 
b Imports other than from the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. 
c Imports other than from Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and Turkmenistan. 
NB – No such breakdown is available for that year. 
 
 
Poland 
 
Table S32 
Poland’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, mmcm). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Russia 7 783 8 166 3 3 5 6 
Germany 906 1 084 1 133 1 714 1 888 2 267 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 586 584 
Turkmenistan 2 508 0 0 0 0 0 
Ukraine 5 5 6 0 0 0 
Other FSU 0 699 0 0 0 0 
Not specified 0 0 9 753 10 073 9 769 9 615 
Total 11 202 9 954 10 895 11 790 12 248 12 473 
 
Table S33 
Poland’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Russia 7 783 8 166 9 756 10 076 9 774 9 621 
Germany 906 1 084 1 133 1 714 1 888 2 267 
Czech Republic – – – – 586 584 
Belgium – – – – – 1 
Other FSU 5a 704b 6c – – – 
Turkmenistan 2 508 – NB – – – 
Total 11 202 9 954 10 895 11 790 12 248 12 473 
e – Estimates. 
NB – No such breakdown is available for that year. 
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Table S34 
Poland’s gas imports, according to BP (2008–2014, bcm). 
Source: BP (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Russia 7.20 7.15 9.08 9.28 9.0 9.6 8.9 
Germany 1.10 0.50 1.07 NB NB NB NB 
Uzbekistan NB 1.50 – – – – – 
Other Europe NB – – 1.55a 2.0b 1.8b 1.7b 
Other Europe & Eurasia 1.50c – – NB NB NB NB 
Total 9.80 9.15 10.15 10.83 10.9 11.4 10.6 
a Imports other than from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. 
b Imports other than from the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. 
c Imports other than from Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and Turkmenistan. 
NB – No such breakdown is available for that year. 
 
 
Lithuania 
 
Table S35 
Lithuania’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, mmcm). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Russia 3 071 2 690 3 053 3 349 3 263 2 661 
Total 3 071 2 690 3 053 3 349 3 263 2 661 
 
Table S36 
Lithuania’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Russia 3 125 2 737 3 106 3 407 3 320 2 707 
Total 3 125 2 737 3 106 3 407 3 320 2 707 
e – Estimates. 
 
Table S37 
Lithuania’s gas imports, according to BP (2008–2011, bcm). 
Source: BP (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Russia 3.09 2.77 2.63 2.89 
Total 3.09 2.77 2.63 2.89 
 
 
Latvia 
 
Table S38 
Latvia’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, mmcm). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Russia 1 368 1 743 1 125 1 755 1 716 1 698 
Total 1 368 1 743 1 125 1 755 1 716 1 698 
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Table S39 
Latvia’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Russia 1 368 1 743 1 125 1 755 1 716 1 734 
Total 1 368 1 743 1 125 1 755 1 716 1 734 
e – Estimates. 
 
Table S40 
Latvia’s gas imports, according to BP (2009–2011, bcm). 
Source: BP (2010, 2011, 2012). 
 2009 2010 2011 
Russia 1.19 0.66 1.50 
Total 1.19 0.66 1.50 
 
 
Croatia 
 
Table S41 
Croatia’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, mmcm). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Russia 1 083 1 000 1 046 0 0 0 
Italy 109 25 0 829 667 595 
Hungary 0 0 22 6 379 280 
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 0 0 176 
Austria 0 0 0 0 27 126 
Slovenia 35 5 2 21 139 74 
Germany 0 0 0 20 60 19 
France 0 0 0 0 86 0 
Not specified 0 14 0 0 0 0 
Total 1 227 1 044 1 070 876 1 358 1 270 
 
Table S42 
Croatia’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Russia 1 083 1 000 1 046 – – – 
Italy NB 25 NB 829 667 900 
Hungary NB – 22 6 379 270 
Germany NB NB NB 20 60 NB 
Non specified 144 19 2 21 252 99 
Total 1 227 1 044 1 070 876 1 358 1 269 
e – Estimates. 
NB – No such breakdown is available for that year. 
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Table S43 
Croatia’s gas imports, according to BP (2008–2011, bcm). 
Source: BP (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Russia 1.06 1.07 1.03 – 
Italy NB 0.13 0.14 NB 
Other Europe & Eurasia 0.23a – – NB 
Other Europe NB – – 0.62b 
Total 1.29 1.20 1.17 0.62 
a Imports other than from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and 
Turkmenistan. 
b Imports other than from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. 
NB – No such breakdown is available for that year. 
 
 
Estonia 
 
Table S44 
Estonia’s gas imports, according to Eurostat (2008–2013, mmcm). 
Source: Eurostat (2015a). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Russia 946 642 689 627 670 678 
Total 946 642 689 627 670 678 
 
Table S45 
Estonia’s gas imports, according to the IEA (2008–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Russia 946 642 689 627 670 678 
Total 946 642 689 627 670 678 
e – Estimates. 
 
Table S46 
Estonia’s gas imports, according to BP (2009–2011, bcm). 
Source: BP (2010, 2011, 2012). 
 2009 2010 2011 
Russia 0.71 0.36 0.63 
Total 0.71 0.36 0.63 
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Table S47 
Gas consumption in CEE, according to the IEA (2003–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011a, 2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Poland 14 638 15 496 16 231 16 185 16 159 16 288 15 990 17 155 17 178 17 973 18 229 
Romania 18 434 17 395 17 285 18 128 16 083 16 002 13 257 13 579 13 927 13 533 12 613 
Hungary 14 576 14 452 14 983 14 202 13 266 13 103 11 332 12 132 11 557 10 130 9 221 
Czech R. 9 658 9 601 9 493 9 292 8 651 8 687 8 184 9 280 8 413 8 386 8 477 
Slovakia 6 989 6 720 7 227 6 575 6 216 6 308 5 397 6 099 5 630 5 289 5 820 
Bulgaria 3 110 3 145 3 525 3 599 3 582 3 508 2 609 2 795 3 188 2 970 2 986 
Croatia 2 884 3 009 2 910 2 878 3 307 3 205 2 959 3 242 3 165 2 972 2 749 
Lithuania 2 943 2 935 3 096 3 068 3 615 3 245 2 727 3 115 3 398 3 318 2 712 
Serbiaa 2 246 2 852 2 388 2 458 2 482 2 486 1 752 2 328 2 389 2 107 2 515 
Latvia 1 677 1 663 1 695 1 756 1 700 1 665 1 528 1 821 1 604 1 508 1 734 
Slovenia 1 104 1 104 1 141 1 105 1 123 1 079 1 022 1 060 906 872 850 
Estonia 847 966 996 1 009 986 946 642 689 627 670 678 
Bosnia & H. 204 321 381 400 413 410 234 245 279 257 190 
Macedonia 81 71 77 83 106 121 80 118 137 142 160 
Albania 14 16 17 17 17 9 9 14 15 17 19 
e – Estimates. 
a Data for Serbia include Montenegro until 2004. 
 
 
Gas consumption in CEE, according to Eurostat (2003–2013, Terajoule).a 
Source: Eurostat (2015c). 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Poland 471 600 497 538 512 337 526 870 523 228 526 204 505 129 536 211 537 527 572 834 574 740 
Romania 616 688 583 528 582 936 594 470 534 319 509 092 442 978 451 688 464 946 451 228 410 052 
Hungary 497 645 490 368 506 349 479 672 448 190 442 161 383 171 410 955 391 630 347 753 322 601 
Czech R. 328 337 326 064 322 528 317 926 303 068 300 342 284 881 337 856 285 086 287 051 290 832 
Slovakia 237 337 230 207 246 336 225 161 213 080 216 303 185 238 209 609 194 144 182 767 201 571 
Bulgaria 104 654 104 363 117 401 121 442 126 040 122 012 90 465 96 312 110 124 102 625 99 977 
Croatia 98 646 102 918 99 220 98 420 113 090 107 884 100 620 110 211 107 610 101 038 95 537 
Lithuania 98 561 98 293 103 684 102 747 121 066 108 674 91 327 104 326 113 799 111 119 90 624 
Serbia 76 210 96 789 81 514 83 387 84 203 83 812 58 407 77 597 79 658 70 249 78 149 
Latvia 56 408 55 785 56 852 58 892 56 922 55 814 51 380 61 206 53 943 50 709 50 438 
Slovenia 37 963 37 628 38 888 37 650 38 275 36 789 34 815 36 125 30 883 29 730 28 966 
Estonia 28 472 32 429 33 481 33 836 33 635 32 260 21 986 23 551 21 072 22 835 23 233 
Macedonia 2 782 2 449 2 624 2 811 3 586 4 077 2 701 4 000 4 618 4 792 5 426 
Albania 452 346 377 377 603 302 308 484 503 554 610 
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
a Gross inland consumption; net calorific value (NCV). One NCV equals to 0.9 gross calorific value (GCV). 
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Table S49 
Gas production in CEE, according to the IEA (2003–2013e, mmcm). 
Source: IEA (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011a, 2012c, 2013b, 2014). 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013e 
Romania 13 029 12 965 12 120 11 942 11 523 11 369 11 252 10 855 10 901 10 935 10 640 
Poland 5 626 5 939 6 057 5 995 6 040 5 750 5 862 6 079 6 247 6 193 6 206 
Hungary 2 945 3 051 3 028 3 095 2 615 2 643 2 968 2 900 2 766 2 234 1 949 
Croatia 2 190 2 198 2 284 2 714 2 892 2 729 2 705 2 727 2 472 2 013 1 856 
Serbiaa 364 317 282 291 244 285 263 387 508 533 575 
Bulgaria 16 336 535 519 290 214 17 73 436 383 278 
Czech R. 168 215 201 194 201 199 178 246 235 263 252 
Slovakia 197 165 147 194 128 102 103 104 121 150 124 
Albania 14 16 17 17 17 9 9 14 15 17 19 
Slovenia 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 7 2 2 3 
Macedonia – – – – – – – – – – – 
Estonia – – – – – – – – – – – 
Bosnia & H. – – – – – – – – – – – 
Latvia – – – – – – – – – – – 
Lithuania – – – – – – – – – – – 
e – Estimates. 
a Data for Serbia include Montenegro until 2004. 
 
Table S50 
Gas production in CEE, according to Eurostat (2003–2013, Terajoule).a 
Source: Eurostat (2015c). 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Romania 436 622 434 483 406 174 400 190 386 556 376 501 374 234 360 844 362 862 363 527 360 068 
Poland 151 197 164 428 162 630 162 463 163 147 154 487 153 980 154 617 161 186 163 570 160 067 
Hungary 95 696 99 090 97 580 99 734 83 926 83 981 95 764 93 570 88 562 74 027 64 656 
Croatia 74 884 75 175 78 092 92 802 98 910 91 872 91 963 92 725 84 028 68 445 63 107 
Serbia 12 351 10 756 9 568 9 873 8 277 8 978 8 762 12 908 16 941 17 786 17 708 
Bulgaria 537 11 189 16 096 15 652 9 869 6 546 548 2 474 14 684 12 907 9 380 
Czech R. 5 488 6 800 6 453 6 168 6 867 6 721 7 608 8 444 7 930 8 956 8 621 
Slovakia 6 970 5 943 5 288 7 368 4 550 3 658 3 670 3 697 4 303 5 325 4 370 
Albania 452 346 377 377 603 302 308 484 503 554 610 
Slovenia 179 181 144 144 108 108 108 251 72 72 108 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Macedonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
a Primary production; net calorific value (NCV). One NCV equals to 0.9 gross calorific value (GCV). 
 
